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ARTICLE
CONSTITUTIONAL FORBEARANCE
A. Christopher Bryant *
INTRODUCTION
Eleven federal judges have ruled on the constitutionality of the
individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act ("ACA"),' also sometimes referred to as "Obamacare."2 Five of
the six judges appointed by Republican Presidents held that the
mandate violated the Constitution, while four of the five judges
appointed by Democratic Presidents upheld the law. In the wake
of these rulings, countless commentators quickly inferred that the
judges' political preferences and affiliations were deciding factors
and forecast that the seemingly inevitable Supreme Court deci-
sion of the matter' would split the High Court 5-4, with Justice
Kennedy casting the deciding vote. The four other Justices ap-
pointed by Republicans are expected to vote to invalidate the law,
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For their comments and suggestions, I thank Lou Bilionis, Emily Houh, Betsy Malloy,
Tom McAffee, Darrell Miller, Michael Solimine, and Verna Williams. Thanks also to the
participants in a faculty workshop at the Washington and Lee University School of Law
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1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 21, 25,
26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., Milton R. Wolf, Buck Up and Stop Obamacare; GOP Should Seek Ap-
proval from Tea Party, Not Democratic Party, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at B3.
3. See Granted & Noted List-October Term 2011, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.
STATES (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/11grantednotedlist.pdf (not-
ing the cases involving the ACA for which the Court will hear oral argument in March
2012).
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and the four Justices appointed by Democrats are expected to
vote to sustain it.4
How we came to this juncture, why, and who bears the blame
are difficult and divisive questions. But for reasons explored be-
low, all those concerned ought to able to agree that the current
state of affairs is regrettable, if not intolerable. In short, as the
Obamacare cases starkly illustrate, our constitutional law too of-
ten looks and is too much like ordinary, partisan politics by an-
other means. Putting aside questions about the provenance of the
present dilemma, this essay ventures a claim about the way out
of this situation. Ironically the same cases that so plainly exhibit
the problem also provide a means to begin solving it.
At the most basic level the solution requires the recovery of a
creditable distinction between constitutional law and partisan
politics. This distinction depends upon, among other things, regu-
lar public displays that such a distinction can and does exist. The
single, most effective way to exhibit the difference between law
and politics is for judges to refrain from advancing politically de-
sirable (to them) ends out of respect for contrary constitutional
law. A judge who exercises this sort of self-restraint engages in
constitutional forbearance. And the Obamacare cases present the
Roberts Court with a singular opportunity for its conservative
members to exercise noble, notable, and healing constitutional
forbearance.
This article begins by developing the concept of constitutional
forbearance and exploring the role it plays in the craft of good
judging. This first Part also illustrates what is meant by constitu-
tional forbearance by recovering a forgotten but illustrative ex-
ample from a century ago. Part II then argues the need for for-
bearance has at present become unusually acute. Finally, in Part
III this article identifies some of the qualities of the Obamacare
cases that make them such singular opportunities for the exercise
of this much needed judicial virtue and answers some anticipated
objections to thinking about the cases in this way.
4. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
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I. FORBEARANCE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VIRTUE
In general, forbearance is an undervalued virtue. To some ex-
tent, this is inevitable, as forbearance tends by its very nature to
be invisible. Conspicuous forbearance may be an oxymoron. Yet it
is hard to resist the conclusion that prior ages valued forbearance
more than our own. The ancient myth of Cincinnatus surrender-
ing his dictatorial authority and returning to a pacific and pasto-
ral lifestyle when the military threat to Rome had been neutral-
ized is celebrated as singularly noble.5 This myth in turn is
echoed in the founding era paeans to George Washington, who on
multiple occasions declined opportunities to assert or seize power
in deference to an emerging culture of constitutional, civilian re-
publican government.' Well into the nineteenth century, the
equation of nobility with forbearance in the exercise of power ex-
erted discernable influence on public discourse. But by the end of
the twentieth century, forbearance was markedly less likely to
figure prominently in narratives of noble public service. When
historians were asked to rank the U.S. Presidents, the results re-
flected a distinct preference for men of bold, even legally dubious
action, over their more restrained colleagues.
A. The Social Value of Judicial Forbearance
One social sphere where a culture of forbearance arguably lin-
gered well into the twentieth century was the realm of jurists. In-
deed, forbearance might be the most indispensable virtue to vir-
tuous judging. In our constitutional order, the judiciary is
5. See Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809, 816 n.33 (1995).
6. See generally GARY WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE
ENLIGHTENMENT 3 (1984) (describing Washington as "a virtuoso of resignations"); see also
Gordon S. Wood, The Greatness of George Washington, 68 VA. Q. REV. 189, 196 (1992) (as-
serting that the "greatest act of his life, the one that made him famous, was his resigna-
tion as commander-in-chief" of the Continental Army after the conclusion of the Revolu-
tionary War).
7. See, e.g., William Douglas, Presidential Legacy; Is Truman Bounce in the Future
for Bush?; Scholars Debate Whether His Status Will Increase After He Leaves Office, THE
HouS. CHRON., Aug. 26, 2007, at Al5; but see Ivan Eland, Op-Ed., From Van Buren to
Bush, a Better Way to Rank US Presidents, CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR, Jan. 20, 1999, at 9
("It's time to rethink the way we rate presidents .... Presidential rankings should be
based on different standards: Did the president uphold the Constitution, and have an
agenda that contributed to peace, prosperity, and liberty, and was he reasonably adept at
getting that agenda implemented?").
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uniquely tasked to enforce fundamental policy determinations not
of its own making. After all, the whole theory of judicial review is
not that the courts may correct legislative missteps but rather
that the judicial duty to the law includes the obligation to enforce
higher law at the expense of a statute when the two are in irrec-
oncilable conflict.! That this classical explanation of judicial re-
view is viewed with skepticism in many quarters provides all the
more reason for judges to act so as to shore up the distinction be-
tween constitutional law and politics.
Constitutional forbearance is the most effective way to accom-
plish this goal. As a general matter, legal forbearance occurs
whenever any public official exercises authority to produce a re-
sult that is, in her eyes, suboptimal but nonetheless required by
law. The concept of the rule of law envisions and requires nothing
less if law is to be anything more than a loose set of discretionary
guidelines to persons in power. A judge or justice engages in con-
stitutional forbearance whenever she concludes that her policy
preferences conflict with what the Constitution requires, and she
then rules in conformity with the latter and in disregard of the
former. In so doing, she offers herself as living proof that consti-
tutional law is not just politics by other means. It is worth noting
that forbearance, so understood, does not necessarily equate to
deference to the political branches of government. To the contra-
ry, forbearance would include invalidation of a wise or even a cru-
cially important statute (in the judge's estimation), if the Consti-
tution (in the judge's estimation) prohibits such a law. Of course,
forbearance would also include acquiescence in a constitutional
statute that the judge believed to be an invitation to disaster or
even a mandate of manifest injustice.
We might hope that our constitutional law would be sufficient-
ly enlightened that it would only rarely permit (or proscribe) that
which thoughtful people oppose (or support). But to the extent
that any separation exists between constitutional law and judicial
policy preferences (often about enormously important and com-
plex matters over which reasonable people profoundly disagree),
such cases are not only inevitable but should be common. In this
8. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at xii (1985) ("[W]hen a judge swears to uphold the Constitu-
tion, he promises obedience to a set of rules laid down by someone else.").
9. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803).
[Vol. 46:695698
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sense, the measure of a good or virtuous judge would not be the
frequency with which she does "the right thing" as she perceives
it, but rather the frequency with which she abstains from doing
so in the name of a contrary legal rule. To the extent that the
Constitution is to be distinct from politics, this measure should be
no less applicable to constitutional than to contract law. If any-
thing, given the inherent ambiguity of a constitution with such
capacious clauses as ours, and intended to endure as long as it
has and (we hope) will, forbearance in the use of judicial review to
accomplish what are, in a judge's eyes, desirable ends may be
even more essential to constitutional legal faith than any other
subject addressed by law.'
As noted above, the traditional justification for judicial review
depends upon the assumption that the Constitution supplies a
rule that trumps any contrary rule supplied by a mere statute."
One need not believe the judicial process a mechanistic one to
conclude that the judge should be significantly constrained in dis-
covering the rule the Constitution provides. This understanding
of judicial review in effect assigns to the judge a crucially im-
portant but sharply limited role. The judge is but one actor in a
larger drama designed to achieve the public good to the extent
that is humanly possible. But the authors of the play did not limit
themselves to an extended judicial soliloquy. Rather, the judge is
merely one agent in what is meant to be a moral system. Of
course the concept of such a limited role should be familiar to any
member of the legal profession serving in an adversarial system
such as our own.12 The notion provides the logically sufficient an-
swer to that notorious question the laity use to bedevil lawyers:
how can you represent people like that (i.e., people guilty of
crimes, or harms to the environment, or outrageous avarice,
etc.)?" The lawyer has accepted a limited and, in isolation, amoral
role in service of a larger scheme designed to serve moral ends."
One need only consider that the alternative system is deemed
10. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of Constitutional
Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 519, 587-88 (2008) (identifying and discussing
some of the negative effects of the politicization of constitutional law).
11. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
12. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
(1975).
13. See, e.g., JAMES S. KUNEN, "How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?": THE MAKING
OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (1983).
14. Id.
2012] 699
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"inquisitorial" to get a fairly good sense of why the adversarial
system might be thought a morally compelling one. A judge simi-
larly accepts an indispensable, but circumscribed role in a larger
system of government carefully wrought, on balance, to best ad-
vance the public good over the long term.
The logic of the matter, in the case of both the advocate and the
judge, is fairly straightforward. But the actual observance of the
limits on one's role can be psychologically trying in the extreme.15
With respect to a judge, this duty requires the individual to sub-
ordinate her own view of the public good to the assessment of
others and then to carry that assessment into effect in concrete
circumstances, which may not have been fully envisioned when
the general policy was formulated and, in any event, which the
judge has come to know far more intimately than would ever be
possible for a legislator acting ex ante. The judge confronts the
particular persons to whom abstract decisions, with which the
judge may or may not agree, are to be applied. When a judge is
called to serve as an agent in effecting (what the judge believes to
be) a misguided or even immoral result, the judge suffers a pro-
found cognitive dissonance," in much the same way as an attor-
ney charged with representing a client the attorney believed to be
in the wrong." In both cases the human mind recoils from this
uncomfortable tension and seeks to avoid it.'" Thus, a danger
arises that the judge will, consciously or unconsciously, distort
her perception of the facts or understanding of the law in an ef-
15. Cf. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. L.
REV. 1485, 1494 (stressing that "judges are engaged in an occupation that involves 'emo-
tional labor"').
16. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
Festinger describes cognitive dissonance as the result of discord among an individual's
knowledge, opinions, and beliefs. See id. at 2-3, 11. He argues that the presence of disso-
nance motivates its subject to engage in dissonance reduction or dissonance avoidance. See
id. at 29-31, 263-65. Numerous legal scholars have recognized the relevance of these in-
sights for understanding and evaluating judicial behavior. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Anderson,
Ideological Dissonance, Disability Backlash, and the ADA Amendments Act, 55 WAYNE L.
REV. 1267, 1297 (2009); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1624-25 (2006).
17. See, e.g., Gabriel Lerner, How Teaching Political and Ethical Theory Could Help
Solve Two of the Legal Profession's Biggest Problems, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781, 783
(2006) (noting that "there is often a dissonance (or at least a perceived dissonance) be-
tween how a human being should ethically behave and how a lawyer should ethically be-
have" and that "[m]ost people want to be decent human beings, yet lawyers, if they make
their clients' interests the highest priority, must frequently do things, such as impugn the
character of a truthful witness, that would be reprehensible if done by a non-lawyer").
18. See supra note 16.
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fort to escape this dilemma." The inevitable propensity for psy-
chological self-defense creates a corresponding risk of cognitive
biases,2 even (perhaps especially) among those judges most com-
mitted to an honorable satisfaction of their official responsibili-
ties.
This natural drift in the direction of a judge's own preferences
must be countered with an equal and opposite force lest the dis-
tinction between law and politics vanish. The source of this coun-
terbalance can either be internal or external to the judiciary.2
The few external constraints on a sitting federal judge's discre-
tion are, by design, notoriously weak22 and are better adapted to
remedy outrageous, self-conscious abuses of the judicial role and
provide little incentive for a judge to be rigorously self-critical
about her own motives and assessments." The principle internal
constraint grows out of the judge's desire to be perceived by her
judicial colleagues, the practicing bar, and, perhaps to a lesser ex-
tent, the general public as consummate in the judicial role.24 This
desire in turn pushes a judge to strive to root out and resist un-
conscious biases and assumptions in constitutional cases only to
the extent these three communities, and especially the first, be-
19. See Dan M. Kahan, "Ideology in"or "Cultural Cognition of'Judging: What Differ-
ence Does It Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413, 417 (2009) (noting that judges might "sincerely
bas[e] their decisions on their views of the law [b]ut that what they understand the law to
require might be shaped by their values-operating not as resources for theorizing law,
but as subconscious, extralegal influences on their perception of legally consequential
facts").
20. See id.
21. For a discussion of the distinction between internal and external constraints on
judges, see Michael J. Gerhardt, How a Judge Thinks, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2185, 2196-97
(2009) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008)).
22. See Richard Albert, The Constitutional Imbalance, 37 N.M. L. REV. 1, 10 (2007)
("They are sheltered from removal (except through the extraordinary act of impeachment)
by the gift of life tenure, buoyed in their words and actions by an indulgent theory of judi-
cial independence, and freed from the solemn commitment to popular accountability.
When coupled with these emoluments, the mighty pen that judges wield without popular
review becomes perhaps the most powerful instrument controlled by any public body in
civil society.").
23. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Foreword, A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 42
(2005) (discussing external constraints on the Court and concluding that "[tihere are polit-
ical limits on what the Court can do, but they are capacious").
24. See Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between
Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1796 (2004) ('To the
extent that judges care about their prestige and power-and truly want to earn the re-
spect of their colleagues and the legal community generally-it is crucial that they be per-
ceived to base their decisions on the law. The prospect of public exposure, criticism, and
reputational harm are among the most powerful forces that lead judges to ground their
decisions in existing legal materials.").
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lieve in and prize preservation of a distinction between constitu-
tional law and politics.
Judges, no less than anyone else, exhibit their commitments
through their actions. A judge's exercise of constitutional forbear-
ance exhibits her belief in and dedication to a separation of con-
stitutional law and her personal political predilections. As such,
instances of judicial forbearance can over time reinforce forbear-
ance as a norm governing judicial behavior." Moreover, a com-
mitment to forbearance depends on a faith that one's judicial col-
leagues both share and rigorously pursue this same virtue.2 6 Each
judicial act of forbearance is in this sense a unilateral step in a
longer sequence aimed at achieving multi-lateral judicial dis-
armament." In a similar fashion departures from the norm weak-
en it.2 8 Law is a socially constructed reality, the meaning and sig-
nificance of which is forever in the process of regeneration." In
order for there to be any law in constitutional law there must be,
among other things, patterns of mutually reinforcing judicial be-
havior that at once make judges be and look like something other
than politicians in robes.
It bears emphasis that the constitutional forbearance depends
not on perceptions alone, but also on the underlying reality. As
Brian Tamanaha has observed:
[Ildeals have the potential to create a reality in their image only so
long as they are believed in and acted pursuant to. This might sound
fanciful, like suggesting that something can be conjured up by wish-
ful thinking; or it might sound elitist, like the "noble lie," the idea
that it is sometimes better for the masses to believe in myths be-
cause the truth is too much to handle. But it is neither. It is a rou-
tine application of the proposition widely accepted among social the-
25. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
236 (2006) (noting that the "threat to the rule of law ... is not that judges are incapable of
rendering decisions in an objective fashion" but rather that they "come to believe that it
cannot be done, or that most fellow judges are not doing it").
26. See id. (identifying judicial skepticism about the dedication of one's colleagues to
following the law as a serious threat to the rule of law).
27. Cf. Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A
Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431, 474-75 (1996) (il-
lustrating through game theory and through other empirical evidence that courts, and es-
pecially the Supreme Court, employ forbearance in situations where it assists their politi-
cal or ideological goals).
28. See TAMANAHA, supra note 25, at 236.
29. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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orists and social scientists that much of social reality is the construc-
30
tion of our ideas and beliefs.
So constitutional forbearance not only leads to a firmer faith in a
distinction between constitutional law and politics, but it also
both reflects and reinforces the truth of that faith.
B. The Analytical Contribution of Forbearance
Even assuming these observations about the importance of
constitutional forbearance are persuasive, what difference ought
these considerations make in the actual practice of the judicial
craft?
None in most cases; a lot in a few. Since the ultimate objective
is to cabin the influence a judge's personal policy preferences
have on the outcome of the cases she decides, most often the wis-
est course is for the judge to pretend like those preferences do not
exist." Of course, this is precisely what, at least superficially,
judges do all the time.32 However, judges no less than the rest of
us, are irreducibly political creatures and their politics necessari-
ly manifest themselves as subtle biases in their perception of both
law and fact." Ignoring these influences will not make them go
away.34 What we can expect judges to do, however, is be aware of
their preferences and resist their gravitational pull.
It would be as inappropriate as it is unlikely were this re-
sistance to manifest itself as hostility to one's preferred outcomes.
30. TAMANAHA, supra note 25, at 6.
31. Justice Frankfurter spoke of himself, albeit some have charged hypocritically, as a
"political eunuch," an arresting metaphor. Cf. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/
FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF TWO SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES 9 (1982).
32. For example Judge Vinson began his opinion striking down the ACA by stating
this case is not about whether the Act is wise or unwise legislation, or wheth-
er it will solve or exacerbate the myriad problems in our health care system.
In fact, it is not really about our health care system at all. It is principally
about our federalist system, and it raises very important issues regarding the
Constitutional role of the federal government.
See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1263 (N.D. Fla. 2011); see also Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768,
780 (E.D. Va. 2010) (calling the government's goal of expanding health care "laudable" but
ultimately concluding that the scheme is unconstitutional).
33. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
34. Cf. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and
the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 895-98 (2009) (urging judges to
identify culturally determined heuristic biases and take steps to minimize their impact).
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Applied rigorously, such an approach would produce a perverse
anti-bias bias that would work a distortion in the legal process
that amounts to a mirror-image of the slant it was adopted to
cure. This corruption would not even provide the benefit of desir-
able (in the judge's eyes) outcomes in individual cases. In the vast
majority of cases, a good judge, like a good umpire," has to "call
them as she sees them," without any weight accorded to either
the home team or the visitors."
But awareness of the value of constitutional forbearance should
pull a judge ever so slightly towards an occasion of its exercise.
The force of this attraction would have to be minimal in magni-
tude to avoid the absurd perversity outlined above. Therefore in
the vast run of cases this attraction would have no effect. In a
narrow set of highly politicized and deeply indeterminate cases,
however, it should be decisive.
The strength of the typically minimal attraction towards for-
bearance should grow as a particular case becomes more politi-
cized." This correlation makes sense for two reasons. First, as the
politicization of a case increases, so does the temptation a judge
might feel to give reign to her personal political predilections. Af-
ter all, the politicization of the case reflects, among other things,
the extent to which persons not party to the suit will be affected
by and care about its resolution." The more widespread the inter-
est in the ruling, the more likely the judge will be corrupted by
35. For likely the most notorious recent use of this analogy, see the statement of Chief
Justice Roberts at his Senate confirmation hearing. See Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts,
Jr.). ("Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them. The role of
an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a
limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.").
36. See id. at 448 (answer of John G. Roberts, Jr. to question posed by Sen. Richard
Durbin ("I had someone ask me in this process . . . 'Are you going to be on the side of the
little guy?' And you obviously want to give an immediate answer, but as you reflect on it, if
the Constitution says that the little guy should win, the little guy is going to win in court
before me. But if the Constitution says that the big guy should win, well, then, the big guy
is going to win, because my obligation is to the Constitution.").
37. There is, of course, no scientific metric by which one can measure the extent to
which a case has been politicized. One can, however, point to indicia that a particular suit
or issue has politicized. Those indicia and their relevance to the ACA cases is discussed at
infra notes 188-259 and accompanying text.
38. Cf. Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Deci-
sionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 974-82 (2009) (discussing the enormous significance
of some judicial opinions for persons not party to the suit).
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that interest.39 As the risk of cognitive bias increases, so must the
force set in opposition to it, at least if it is expected to have the
desired effect. Second, as a case becomes increasingly politicized,
the risk that others will perceive, correctly or not, that a ruling is
politically motivated likewise increases." Though the point of for-
bearance is not solely or even primarily about professional and
public perceptions, but they do matter."
Also important is the degree to which the relevant constitu-
tional law is settled and relatively clearly dictates a result in the
case. Even at its zenith, the draw of forbearance should not be
strong enough to displace a settled legal rule. The whole point of
forbearance is to strengthen rule of law values, so it would make
no sense to compromise them in its service. But as is developed
below, modern constitutional law is hardly mathematical in its
precision. Moreover, even within the realm of constitutional law,
there are areas that are more or less rule-bound than others. In
those cases where the traditional tools of constitutional analy-
sis-constitutional text, history, precedent-leave the judge with
little direction and much discretion, even the ordinarily negligible
pull towards attraction should be enough to move the needle and
resolve the controversy.
At least that is the theory of judicial virtue underlying this ar-
ticle. But how has this theory been reflected in actual practice? A
historical example supplies concrete detail to an otherwise hope-
lessly abstract discussion. It might also provide some defense to
the charge naivet6.
C. The Ghost of Forbearance Past
History has not been kind to Justice James Clark McReynolds,
and for good reason." But his unfortunate, even unforgivable,
bigotry and boorish behavior ought not obscure his virtues as a
39. See Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1605-06 (2004) ("In cases of high political salience ... judges are
most in need of guidance from the Constitution because these are the cases where their
raw personal preferences are most likely to distort the judicial norm of dispassionate
analysis.").
40. See id.
41. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
42. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
43. See generally JAMES E. BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES
CLARK MCREYNOLDS (1992).
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judge, the chief of which was an unwavering dedication to consti-
tutional duty as he perceived it. On at least two historic occa-
sions, this dedication trumped his personal predilections to his
everlasting credit.
The first was the product of his belief that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected a core sphere of individual autonomy from
regulatory infringement. This belief was notoriously manifest in
his much-maligned adherence to economic substantive due pro-
cess well past what in retrospect can clearly be seen as the doc-
trine's expiration date.44 He is less well remembered for his faith-
ful adherence to these principles in non-economic contexts on
behalf of then widely vilified ethnic and religious minorities.
While the following passage from the Court's opinion in Meyer v.
Nebraska is oft-quoted, it is rarely noted that McReynolds was its
author:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the lib-
erty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the com-
mon occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, estab-
lish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
45happiness by free men.
Still, the context of the ruling is even less often recalled. At the
height of the anti-German hysteria following U.S. entry into the
First World War, Nebraska, like many states, enacted laws that
prohibited the teaching of any modern language other than Eng-
lish.46 McReynolds was far from immune from the kind of vehe-
ment passions that led to these enactments. Indeed, in a notori-
ous dissent from the Court's reversal of two German-Americans
espionage convictions, McReynolds defended anti-German preju-
dice as justified by common experience.4 ' But he was able to bridle
44. See, e.g., Gold Clause Cases, 294 U.S. 240, 316, 369-70 (1935) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 541-42 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissent-
ing).
45. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
46. William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 125, 125, 133 (1988).
47. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 42-43 (1921) (McReynolds, J., dissent-
ing); see also PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY
VALUES 87-90 (1997) (discussing McReynolds's hostility to Germans).
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these passions when confronted with the claim that the Constitu-
tion protected individuals from such prohibitions, over a dissent
by Justice Holmes. In doing so, he led the Court to an exemplary
and praiseworthy act of constitutional forbearance. This was not
a singular episode in McReynolds's long judicial career. He exhib-
ited impressive forbearance in service of constitutional principle
when confronted with the federal government's first volley in the
now century-old "war on drugs." Within ten years of the New
York legislature's enactment of one of the nation's first major
narcotics laws, Congress passed the revealingly labeled Harrison
Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914.4' The Court construed the Act broadly
to supplant any contrary state law and impose a nationwide
blanket prohibition on the sale of narcotics, to be enforced with
severe criminal penalties, excepting only that distribution the
Treasury Department (and the Court) deemed to be "in the regu-
lar course of the professional practice of [medicine] ."49 Then in
United States v. Doremus, the Court rebuffed the claim that the
Act, so construed, exceeded Congress's power to tax. Justice
Day's opinion reasoned that the Act was within the ambit of con-
gressional authority so long as it had "some reasonable relation"
to the raising of revenue, even if the law's "effect [was] to accom-
plish another purpose as well."" Courts were not to inquire into
congressional motives.52 Applying these precepts, Justice Day ea-
gerly endorsed the fiction that the regulatory character of the
Harrison Act was merely incidental to its revenue raising func-
tion manifested solely in the statute's imposition of a nominal $1
per annum tax." Four Justices, including McReynolds, dissent-
ed.54
Judicial deference to claimed congressional purposes may be
defensible, even laudable, in light of the relative institutional
competence and legitimacy of these two branches of the national
48. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 355
(1993). See generally Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The Futility and De-
structiveness of Prohibition, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1305, 1312 (1983).
49. United States v. Doremus, 246 F. 958, 959 (W.D. Tex. 1918) (quoting indictment),
rev'd, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
50. 249 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1919).
51. Id. at 94.
52. Id. at 93 ("IFIrom an early day the court has held that the fact that other motives
may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize the courts to inquire
into that subject.").
53. Id. at 90, 93-95.
54. Id. at 95.
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government. But selective deference is, of course, not deference at
all, but rather merely a disguise for inchoate judicial policy judg-
ments avowedly the province of the legislature. And in The Child
Labor Tax Case, the Court selectively abandoned the posture of
deference it had assumed in Doremus in favor of its perceived ob-
ligation to assess independently whether the challenged law "im-
pose[d] a tax with only that incidental restraint and regulation
which a tax must inevitably involve" or whether the statute "reg-
ulate[d] by the use of the so-called tax as a penalty."" Chief Jus-
tice Taft sententiously intoned that "[i]t is the high duty and
function of this court in cases regularly brought to its bar to de-
cline to recognize or enforce seeming laws of Congress" whenever
such laws dealt "with subjects not entrusted to Congress, but left
or committed by the supreme law of the land to the control of the
states."" As to why this "high duty and function" did not require
the Court to invalidate the Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act as well,"
Taft had little to say.
Justice McReynolds was, appropriately, troubled by the Court's
inconsistency on federalism. In his opinion for a unanimous Court
in United States v. Daugherty, he welcomed, indeed sketched, an
argument that Doremus be overruled:
The constitutionality of the [Harrison] Anti-Narcotic Act, touching
which this court so sharply divided in United States v. Doremus, was
not raised below, and has not been again considered. The doctrine
approved in Hammer v. Dagenhart, The Child Labor Tax Case, [
and Linder v. United States, may necessitate a review of that ques-
tion if hereafter properly presented.5 8
But a majority of the Justices were content to allow Congress to
exercise what in effect amounted to a general police power so long
as the power was discharged against conduct the Justices them-
selves found abhorrent. When the issue finally returned in Nigro
55. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922).
56. Id. at 37.
57. His opinion identified only one difference between the two statutes. Whereas the
Child Labor Tax Law was "on the face of the act ... a penalty," any ulterior motive that
may have contributed to the passage of the narcotics law was "not shown on [its] face." Id.
at 39, 43. But even that alleged difference ignored the unanswered conclusion of the
Doremus trial court and four Supreme Court dissenters that the terms of the Harrison Act
standing alone revealed that the law's actual purpose was narcotics regulation, not reve-
nue collection. See A. Christopher Bryant, The Third Death of Federalism, 17 CORNELL J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 109-10 (2007) (discussing the Harrison Act cases).
58. 269 U.S. 360, 362-63 (1926) (citations omitted).
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v. United States, the Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the
Harrison Act."
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Taft first adopted the
government's broad interpretation of the Act, which in effect
criminalized receipt of the covered narcotics by anyone absent a
physician's lawful prescription for an approved medicinal use."
So interpreted, the Act fairly obviously constituted a spurious use
of the taxing power to prohibit private conduct deemed dangerous
and immoral, a responsibility not entrusted by the Constitution's
enumerated powers to the federal government, but rather one re-
served to the states. In form at least, Chief Justice Taft agreed
that the federal government lacked any such power." Taft never-
theless upheld the Act on the transparent fiction that its strict
constraints on both those who might sell and those who might
buy narcotics were merely incidental to tax collection." Taft rea-
soned that the section's requirement that purchasers also be reg-
istered (unless they held a valid physician's prescription) relieved
the revenue service of a significant enforcement burden-namely,
the need of "sending to examine the list" of registered sellers to
determine whether a particular seller's name appeared thereon."
But this imagined administrative convenience was eclipsed by the
prohibitory effect worked by such a broad construction of the Act.
Because would-be non-medicinal users were not even permitted
to register, they could never obtain the forms necessary to make a
purchase. 4 It was as if Congress prohibited the sale of all alcohol-
59. 276 U.S. 332, 338, 354 (1928) (addressing and resolving a series of questions that
the Eighth Circuit had, in a now-extinct procedure, certified for Supreme Court considera-
tion).
60. Id. at 344.
61. Early in his analysis, he rather righteously avowed that
[i]n interpreting the act, we must assume that it is a taxing measure, for oth-
erwise it would be no law at all. If it is a mere act for the purpose of regulat-
ing and restraining the purchase of the opiate and other drugs, it is beyond
the power of Congress, and must be regarded as invalid, just as the Child La-
bor Act of Congress was held to be.
Id. at 341 (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 20).
62. Id. at 353-54.
63. Id. at 345. Chief Justice Taft also noted that, in the years intervening between the
events at issue in Doremus and those with which the instant case was concerned, Con-
gress had amended the Act to increase the tax and the revenue produced thereby. Id. at
353. For an argument that because this intervening amendment augmented the revenue
raised under the Act the amendment supplied the foundation for constitutionality woefully
lacking in Doremus, see Robert C. Brown, When is a Tax Not a Tax?, 11 IND. L.J. 399,
421-22 (1936).
64. See Harold Gill Reuschlein & Albert B. Spector, Taxing and Spending: The Load-
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ic beverages in order to ensure that distributors paid the excise
tax on alcohol sales. Taft justified congressional elimination of
the non-medicinal narcotics market as a means of ensuring that
the distributors in that market paid their registration fees." The
surgery was a success, but the patient died.
McReynolds must have been sympathetic with the policy of
narcotics prohibition, likely for reasons both righteous and igno-
ble." But he declined to join in the Court's willful blindness. In
his dissent, he rejected as an artifice the claim that "Congress
could have supposed that collection of the prescribed tax would be
materially aided by requiring" purchasers to use an order form
that they could not lawfully obtain." He then acknowledged what
must have been obvious to everyone, namely that Congress's
"plain intent [was] to control the traffic within the States by pre-
venting sales except to registered persons and holders of prescrip-
tions," a bald usurpation of the police power reserved to the
States." Thus, unlike most of his colleagues," McReynolds resist-
ed the temptation to honor federalism in the breach in service of
the apparently worthy causes of preventing addiction and pre-
serving traditional mores,o causes in which he must have whole-
heartedly believed. In so doing, he again demonstrated admirable
fortitude, exemplified judicial forbearance, and exhibited a dis-
tinction between constitutional law and politics. As explained be-
low, the challenge to the individual health-insurance mandate
provides sitting judges with an unparalleled opportunity to follow
his example.
ed Dice of a Federal Economy, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 20-21 (1937) (discussing the practical
effect of the Harrison Act).
65. See Nigro, 276 U.S. at 354.
66. McReynolds expressly acknowledged the "evils incident to the use of opium." Id. at
357 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). For a discussion of McReynolds's antipathy for unortho-
dox persons and conduct, see generally BOND, supra note 43, at 124-26, 136.
67. Nigro, 276 U.S. at 356 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 354. Justice Sutherland joined Justice McReynolds's dissent. Id. at 357. Jus-
tice Butler dissented on the ground that he would have rejected the government's broad
construction of the Act, thereby, avoided the constitutional question. Id. at 358 (Butler, J.,
dissenting).
70. Id. at 357 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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II. A TIME RIPE FOR FORBEARANCE
Rarely has the need for constitutional forbearance been more
acute than it is today. The very possibility of a meaningful dis-
tinction between law and politics is dismissed as naive by some."
To those truly hardened into this skepticism, this essay has little
to say. Many others, however, hold out hope in the possibility of
this demarcation, while at the same time their doubts grow about
current federal judges' and justices' commitment to achieving it."
To be sure, this problem was long in the making. One of the
central, recurring questions of twentieth-century American histo-
ry was what role judicial review ought to play in the nation's po-
litical and social life. A mere five years into the century, a divided
Supreme Court asserted the power and duty to scrutinize regula-
tions governing labor contracts, then an emerging trend in the
wake of industrialization, in the name of common law rights to
which the Court had accorded constitutional status. Of course,
the resulting economic substantive due process jurisprudence,
when joined with inconstant efforts to limit Congress to a strict
reading of its enumerated powers, ultimately provoked a singu-
lar constitutional crisis in which the Court first resisted and then
succumbed to concentrated pressure from Congress and the Pres-
ident.7 ' During this same period legal theory underwent momen-
tous change, as a nineteenth-century faith in natural law and le-
gal science was replaced with legal realism's emphasis on the
inevitable choices judges made in deciding cases, even when pur-
porting to do so according to an apparently mechanistic applica-
tion of legal rules. Some realists went so far as to contest the
power of law to provide any constraint on raw judicial will.77 Oth-
71. See TAMANAHA, supra note 25, at 239-42 (discussing and critiquing this view).
72. Id. at 237, 240.
73. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) ("There is no reasonable
ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by determin-
ing the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker.").
74. See generally Bryant, supra note 57, at 102-05 (discussing the Court's efforts to
limit Congress to its enumerated powers).
75. See generally THOMAS B. MCAFFEE ET AL., POWERS RESERVED FOR THE PEOPLE
AND THE STATES: A HISTORY OF THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS 143-61 (2006)
(chronicling the Supreme Court's struggle with President Roosevelt over pieces of his New
Deal legislation).
76. See TAMANAHA, supra note 25, at 237, 240.
77. See id. at 237.
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er more moderate critics sustained a faith in law's capacity to
constrain judicial will, while also acknowledging that judgments
about matters of public policy were an unavoidable aspect of judg-
* 78ing.
The Court's ill-fated New Deal Era confrontation with the polit-
ical branches was soon explained as the wages of the judicial sin
of hubris. The Court had conflated its legitimate role in enforcing
fundamental law with an illegitimate resistance to the politically
unfamiliar." The lesson widely drawn from the clash and the
Court's ensuing retreat was that the Court was poorly situated
and ill-equipped to second guess the inevitable compromises em-
bodied in social and economic legislation.o At the same time, the
Court asserted the possibility of a more active role in the protec-
tion of "discrete and insular minorities," who might be unable to
protect themselves in the legislative arena." This well-worn nar-
rative is reiterated here, blessedly in brief, to underscore that at
the heart of American jurisprudence, in the early decades of the
last century, was a skepticism about a distinction between law,
especially constitutional law, and politics.
The Court's reservation of a theoretical right to intervene on
behalf of minorities became a reality with its 1954 invalidation of
public-school segregation in Brown v. Board of Education,82 the
pre-eminent legal event of the century. A former governor of Cali-
fornia, Chief Justice Warren wrote for a unanimous Court, which
dismissed the historical record of the Fourteenth Amendment as
"[a]t best, ... inconclusive,"" and proceeded with a highly contex-
tualized and pragmatic discussion of the contemporary im-
portance of education and the psychological harms of segrega-
tion.8 4 Though Warren's opinion rested on the uniqueness of
education, the Court in short order and by a series of laconic per
78. See id. at 237-38.
79. See generally ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A
STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS (1941) (discussing the Supreme Court's
willingness to overstep its constitutional limitations to thwart innovation).
80. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 151 (1938) (affording sig-
nificant deference to the legislature in making economic decisions about the safety of
shipping certain types of milk across states lines).
81. Id. at 153 n.4.
82. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
83. Id. at 489.
84. Id. at 493-95 & n.11 (citing psychological studies that showed segregation led to
inferiority complexes among black schoolchildren).
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curiam opinions extended the constitutional prohibition on segre-
gation to buses," public beaches," and municipal golf courses."'
These decisions left some legal liberals pleased with these patent-
ly noble outcomes but worried about their legality. Most famous-
ly, and to many infamously, Professor Herbert Wechsler pondered
publicly whether the cases, whose results he applauded, could be
squared with a commitment to any "neutral principles" of consti-
tutional law."
Of course, this same skepticism has dogged the Court and its
students ever since, waxing and waning according to the contro-
versy created by the Court's decisions. But there is reason to be-
lieve that the issue has recently grown in prominence and that
another crisis in confidence may be at hand. To be sure, the twen-
tieth century was a harrowing time for those who believe that
constitutional law can and should be something more than just
politics. Unfortunately, so far the twenty-first century has been
even worse.
The decade got off to a terrible start when the five more con-
servative Justices embraced a novel equal protection argument in
the service of resolving, in their favor, the deep and enduring dis-
pute over the 2000 presidential election." As bad as this was, it
was further exacerbated by the remarkably partisan response of
the legal academy.o Steven Calabresi was in splendid isolation as
the sole demonstrably conservative legal scholar who challenged
the validity of what the Court had done."
But this was only the beginning. After one relatively quiet
term, the Court in June 2003 splintered over two of the more di-
85. Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903
(1956).
86. Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore City, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 350
U.S. 877 (1955).
87. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), vacated per curiam, 350 U.S. 879
(1955).
88. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 17 (1959).
89. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
90. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conserva-
tive Mirror, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 386-90 (2001) (noting that "the voluminous com-
mentary on Bush v. Gore has mirrored the Court's ideological split").
91. See Steven G. Calabresi, A Political Question, in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF
LEGITIMACY 129-44 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002).
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visive political issues of the day-homosexuality92 and affirmative
action." In both instances, the opinions for the Court said rela-
tively little about constitutional text, ratification-era history, or
precedent, not surprisingly as these traditional tools of constitu-
tional law either shed little light on the matter or affirmatively
contradicted the majority's resolution of the issue.4 The cases also
provoked unusually lengthy and passionate dissents. As with
Bush v. Gore," the academic response was similarly polarized and
apparently aligned with the authorial ideology."
In June 2005, the Court handed down two rulings that, rather
bizarrely, approved a public display of the Ten Commandments in
Texas but disallowed a similar display in Kentucky." Only one
Justice saw any difference between the two cases, but given the
contest on the Court concerning its Establishment Clause juris-
prudence, that was sufficient for different results." Then, without
overruling its 2000 decision invalidating Nebraska's ban on so-
called "partial-birth" abortions,"oo seven years and two new Jus-
tices later the Court sustained a remarkably similar federal
law."0 ' The academic response was largely one of shock and incre-
dulity.102
92. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
93. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
94. Of course, Lawrence expressly overruled the precedent most clearly on point. See
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-78 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). In
Grutter, both the majority and the dissent claimed the advantage of precedent. Compare
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322-23, with id. at 379-80 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
95. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586-606 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 349-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
97. Compare Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447
(2004), with Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our Philosopher-Kings Adopt Libertari-
anism as Our Official National Philosophy and Reject Traditional Morality as a Basis for
Law, 65 OHIo ST. L.J. 1139 (2004).
98. Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005), with McCreary Cnty. v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850, 857-58 (2005).
99. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703-04 (Breyer, J., concurring).
100. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921-22 (2000).
101. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124-33 (2007).
102. See Pushaw, supra note 10, at 567 (asserting that "[m]ost commentators agreed
that Gonzales took a large step in the direction of eventually overruling Roe" and that
"[piro-choice advocates viewed this development with trepidation, while pro-life supporters
welcomed it"). The Court's claim that it had not overruled Stenberg was widely dismissed
as disingenuous. Id. at 569 n.289 ("Most constitutional law scholars concluded that Gonza-
les effectively overturned Stenberg."); Id. at 568 ("Justice Kennedy's attempts to distin-
guish Stenberg were strained and unconvincing.").
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Later that same term, the Justices fought fiercely over the
rightful legacy of Brown v. Board of Education.'o In Parents In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, the Court,
via a plurality opinion by the Chief Justice, invalidated race-
based pupil assignment regimes in two public school systems.104
Circling Justice Kennedy's decisive but vague concurrence in the
result,o' the plurality and the dissents accused one another of
disrespecting the true meaning of the half-century-old canonical
case.106 Justice Stevens took the extraordinary step of ending his
dissent with the pointed declaration that
The Court has changed significantly [in the three previous decades].
It was then more faithful to Brown and more respectful of our prece-
dent than it is today. It is my firm conviction that no Member of the
Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today's deci-
.107
sion."
While this claim can be read different ways, it certainly calls into
question the Court's institutional dedication to the rule of law.
In June 2008, in what was perhaps its most jurisprudentially
significant ruling of the decade, the Court went bitterly, if not
boldly, into the final frontier of constitutional interpretation-the
Second Amendment. In District of Columbia v. Heller, a bare five-
Justice majority concluded that the Amendment protected an in-
dividual right and invalidated the District's handgun ban.o' The
case stimulated intense passions, both on and off the Court, even
among such stalwart conservatives as Judges Wilkinson and Pos-
ner.o' Critics accused the Court's conservative members of pre-
cisely the sort of judicial activism they had long reviled when in
dissent."0 Of course, these tensions were inflamed anew when the
103. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
104. 551 U.S. 701, 709-11 (2007).
105. See id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106. Compare id. at 746 ("[W]hen it comes to using race to assign children to schools,
history will be heard."), with id. at 868 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("To invalidate the plans
under review is to threaten the promise of Brown.").
107. Id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. 554 U.S. 570, 634-36 (2008).
109. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law,
95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court
and Gun Control, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32.
110. See Wilkinson, supra note 109, at 265, 274-75; Posner, supra note 109 at 35.
2012] 715
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Court, again in a 5-4 ruling, extended the rule of Heller to state
and local governments."
The Court had hardly avoided political controversy in the
meantime. In February 2010, the Court decided Citizens United
v. FEC, which expressly overruled one precedent and part of an-
other on the way to invalidating the 2002 federal statutory re-
strictions on corporation and union expenditures for speech close-
ly related to imminent federal elections."2 Justice Stevens,
writing one of the last dissents of his career, was nearly apoplec-
tic."' The case earned President Obama's rebuke in his first State
of the Union address, which in turn provoked a much ballyhooed
inaudible but unmistakable "not true" from the attending Justice
Alito."' The ruling was extraordinarily unpopular,"5 and was per-
ceived by many as at best naive and at worst in service of the Re-
publican party, which likely had the most to gain from virtually
unlimited corporate spending in federal elections." 6 The timing of
the ruling maximized its effect on the 2010 congressional elec-
tions,"' and the decision may have played a role in last fall's Re-
publican resurgence.
One need not conclude that all, or even any, of these cases were
wrongly decided to recognize that the cumulative effect of so
many sharply divided rulings on some of the most politically divi-
sive issues of our time is to further politicize the Court and con-
stitutional law. Indeed, commentators representing a wide array
perspectives have so noted. Judge Posner devoted the unique op-
portunity afforded by his Harvard Law Review "Foreword" to the
Review's analysis of the October 2004 term to explaining in math-
ematical and merciless detail why he had concluded that the Su-
111. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
112. 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010).
113. Id. at 931 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's ruling threatens to undermine
the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation.").
114. See Shannen W. Coffin, 'Not True' With its Citizens United Decision, the Supreme
Court Struck a Blow for Free Speech, NATIONAL REVIEW, Feb. 22, 2010, at 18.
115. See Richard L. Hasen, Op-Ed., Is it All About Scalia?, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Apr.
15, 2010, at B7.
116. See Dan Eggen & Ben Pershing, Democrats Scramble After Campaign Ruling;
Corporate Purse Strings May Be Tough to Tighten as Midterms Approach, WASH. POST,
Jan. 23, 2010, at Al.
117. See Court Ruling on Election Spending Expected, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 2010, at
2; Eggen & Pershing, supra note 116, at Al; High Court Ruling Leaves States Scrambling
to Close Gaps on Spending Limits, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2010, at 12.
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preme Court was "A Political Court.""' Conservative scholars
have long decried the Court's politicization of constitutional
law."' And the experience of first the Rehnquist and now the
Roberts Courts has provoked similar protests from more liberal
quarters .120
It would take far more space than the article format allows to
thoroughly canvass just the relatively recent legal literature de-
crying the politicization of the modern Supreme Court and mod-
ern constitutional law, so the rather random sampling set forth in
the notes will have to suffice. But the one principle that should
emerge is that this frustration is not limited to any part of the po-
litical spectrum.1 2' Rather, there is a consensus emerging from all
quarters that it is increasingly difficult to take modern constitu-
tional law, at least as articulated by the Supreme Court, all that
seriously.'2 2 Even Brian Tamanaha-whose refreshing call upon
the profession and especially the legal academy to recover a
"more balanced realism" in no small part inspired the present
piece-writes off constitutional law as a lost cause.'"
Not surprisingly the growing equation of constitutional law
with raw political will has increasingly corrupted the process for
nominating and confirming federal judges, most acutely at the
federal courts of appeals level.'24 Of course, the Supreme Court
118. Posner, supra note 23, at 33-34. To be sure, Judge Posner thought this state of
affairs to some extent inevitable, but he also urged a more "modest" approach than had
prevailed in recent rulings. Id. at 54-60.
119. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997). See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating
Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?,
109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1538 n.6, 1539 & n.9 (2000) (citing articles attacking Casey as an un-
principled surrender to political expedience); Pushaw, supra note 10, at 587-88 (collecting
examples).
120. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Under-
standing the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1049-50 (2001); William P.
Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV.
1217, 1219, 1221 (2002); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at A23.
121. Compare supra note 119, with supra note 120.
122. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 10, at 527 (describing a "decades-long movement
that has rendered the process and substance of constitutional decision making almost in-
distinguishable from simple politics").
123. See TAMANAHA, supra note 25, at 164.
124. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 10, at 588 ("Not surprisingly, the merger of constitu-
tional law with raw politics has corrupted the judicial appointment process, especially at
the Supreme Court level."). To be sure, the problem is not a new one. See generally
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appointment process has not been immune from this corruption.1
Even the ACA cases themselves reflect the acuteness of the pre-
sent need for constitutional forbearance. The public reaction to
them has generally assumed that the division among the lower
courts is explainable by the judges' various partisan sympathies
and that this division will continue as the cases progress up the
federal judicial latter.126
III. "OBAMACARE" As CONSTITUTIONAL OPPORTUNITY
The foregoing history of constitutional forbearance and the
acuteness of the present need for more of the same provide a con-
text for fully appreciating the potentially enormous, long-term
significance of judicial rulings on the constitutionality of the indi-
vidual health insurance mandate. Sadly, the possibility of judicial
unanimity is already behind us. But even so, an extraordinary
opportunity both to conjure and illustrate a separation between
our constitutional law and our politics remains. It is the oppor-
tunity for the exercise of constitutional forbearance. This part
both identifies some of the reasons this is true and explores ways
in which that opportunity might be fulfilled or squandered.
A. Constitutional Indeterminacy
The central substantive constitutional issue raised in the liti-
gation concerning the ACA is whether the Commerce Clause,
alone or as aided by the Necessary and Proper Clause, grants
Congress power to enact the individual health insurance man-
date."' One would be hard pressed to find an area of the law more
notoriously indeterminate and subject to political manipulation
than the Court's current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which
one leading commentator has declared "analytical chaos."2 8 Ac-
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1994).
125. See TAMANAHA, supra note 25, at 181-84; see also supra note 124.
126. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
127. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Health-Related Tax Provisions of PPACA and HCERA:
Contingent, Complex, Incremental, and Lacking Cost Controls, 2010 N.Y.U. REV. EMP.
BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 7.01 (2010).
128. Pushaw, supra note 10, at 579 ("For instance, the Court ... [has] declared that
Congress cannot interfere with areas of 'traditional state concern,' such as crime and edu-
cation, but did not explain why it had allowed Congress to pass over 3,000 criminal laws
and establish a Department of Education.").
718 [Vol. 46:695
CONSTITUTIONAL FORBEARANCE
cordingly, any claim that a federal statute "clearly" exceeds Con-
gress's power under these clauses ought to, and ordinarily is, met
with skepticism. Moreover, this claim is unusually untenable
when made with respect to the ACA's individual mandate."'
1. The Case for Congressional Power
All agree that the federal government is one of enumerated and
therefore limited powers."o Two clauses in Article I, Section 8 are
most obviously relevant to the question of whether Congress has
the power to enact the individual mandate. The first accords
Congress power "to regulate commerce ... among the several
States."' The second, authorizes Congress to "make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution"
its power over interstate commerce (and all other powers the
Constitution vests in the federal government).132
Considering first the congressional power to regulate com-
merce, what is "Commerce" for these purposes? Whatever may be
the outer boundaries of this term, more than six decades ago the
Supreme Court held that the business of insurance was "com-
merce" within the meaning of Article I, Section 8. 13 In United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, the Court observed
that "[n]o commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its
activities across state lines ha[d] been held to be wholly beyond
the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause"
and expressly declined the invitation to "make an exception of the
business of insurance."'34 As Harvard law professor and Reagan
Administration Solicitor General Charles Fried recently observed,
"the law has not departed from the conclusion for a moment
129. See ACA, 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (Supp. IV 2010) (requiring non-exempted individuals
to maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage beginning in 2014).
130. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 891 (E.D. Mich.
2010) ("In the body of jurisprudence interpreting the Commerce Clause, the Supreme
Court has set out a three-prong analysis to determine if a federal law properly falls within
this enumerated grant of authority."); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp.
2d 768, 780 (E.D. Va. 2010) ("Despite the laudable intentions of Congress in enacting a
comprehensive and transformative health care regime, the legislative process must still
operate within constitutional bounds. Salutatory goals and creative drafting have never
been sufficient to offset an absence of enumerated powers.").
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
133. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
134. Id.
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since" this 1944 ruling."' And although South-Eastern Under-
writers concerned fire insurance, nowhere in all the Obamacare
litigation's voluminous filings is it contended that the holding of
that case does not extend to health insurance. Similarly, all the
litigants and jurists in these cases, however vigorously they dis-
pute other questions, are nevertheless in complete agreement
that the health insurance industry is one that bestrides state
lines like a colossus. Once it is acknowledged that health insur-
ance is interstate "commerce" within the meaning of the Com-
merce Clause, Congress then enjoys plenary power, under nearly
two-century-old precedent, to "prescribe the rule" to govern the
conduct of that enterprise."' As Chief Justice Marshall wrote
nearly two centuries ago, Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause
is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which com-
merce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Con-
gress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the consti-
tution. . . . If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of
Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those
objects, the power over commerce ... among the several States, is
vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single govern-
ment, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise
of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. 3 7
In short, Congress has the power to make the rules as to how
the health insurance business is to operate."' The bookend re-
quirements that health insurers not refuse coverage to persons
with pre-existing conditions.3 . and that individuals not wait until
135. The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4-5 (prepared statement of Professor Charles Fried, Harvard
Law School).
136. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
137. Id. at 196-97. For a fictional opinion purporting to reflect Chief Justice Marshall's
conclusion that Congress lacked power to enact "health laws," and would therefore have
rejected the claim that Congress had power to enact the ACA, see Robert G. Natelson &
David B. Kopel, "Health Laws of Every Description'" John Marshall's Ruling on a Federal
Health Care Law, 12 ENGAGE 49, 52 (2011).
138. Questions may in due course arise as to the constitutionality of congressional del-
egation of this authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See generally
Sam Foster Halabi, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010: Rulemaking in
the Shadow of Incentive-Based Regulation, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. (2011) (anticipating
these and other issues arising in the actual implementation of the ACA).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 18001(c)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 2010) (prohibiting health insurers from im-
posing "any pre-existing condition exclusion").
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they are sick to apply for health insurance... are rules governing
the conduct of the health insurance business, and therefore ap-
pear plainly to be within the ambit of congressional authority.
The case for congressional power to enact the mandate is strik-
ingly plain and straightforward, far more so than the case for
congressional power to enact numerous other provisions in the
U.S. Code. The point is not that the individual mandate is patent-
ly constitutional and all arguments to the contrary border on fri-
volity, though to be sure several other distinguished commenta-
tors have so concluded."' For present purposes, it suffices to
show, as the foregoing presentation has, that the case for con-
gressional power can be made under well settled Supreme Court
precedents. It hardly requires heavy lifting for a federal judge to
sustain the constitutionality of the individual mandate.
But even if there were a weak link hidden somewhere in this
chain of reasoning, an alternative argument independently sup-
ports congressional authority. Even if the individual mandate
were not a regulation of commerce within the meaning of the
Commerce Clause, Congress would in any event have sufficient
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to impose it.14
That clause, among other things, grants Congress the power to
enact any regulation, not otherwise prohibited by the Constitu-
tion, that can be deemed 'an essential part of a larger regulation
of economic activity.""43 Put differently, "where Congress has the
authority to enact a regulation of interstate commerce, 'it pos-
sesses every power needed to make that regulation effective." 44
This power extends even to intrastate, non-economic matters. 4 '
Furthermore, in considering whether a non-economic, intrastate
regulation is "essential" to the success of a larger regulatory
scheme, the Court does not evaluate the relationship inde-
pendently.'4 ' Rather, "[t]he relevant question is simply whether
140. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (requiring most individuals to maintain minimum levels
of health insurance coverage starting in 2014).
141. See, e.g., The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4-5 (2011) (prepared statement of Professor Charles
Fried, Harvard Law School).
142. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
143. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
144. Id. (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942)).
145. Id. at 37.
146. Id.
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the means chosen are reasonably adapted to the attainment of a
legitimate end under the commerce power."', It is sufficient that
Congress "could reasonably conclude"48 that its broader regulato-
ry scheme would be undercut absent the supplemental regulation
of even a wholly intrastate and non-economic matter.
With respect to the ACA's individual mandate, it would be dif-
ficult to conclude otherwise. The mandate was an indispensable
corollary to the Act's most fundamental industry reform.
A principal justification for the ACA was that millions of Amer-
icans lacked health insurance. 149 Moreover, the number of unin-
sured Americans was growing at an alarming rate.' Many Amer-
icans had lost their insurance after changing jobs."' Because
health insurance in the United States has for decades been a
benefit provided to most permanent employees, a change in em-
ployers frequently also meant a change in health insurers.152
Meanwhile, health insurance companies increasingly declined to
insure persons with pre-existing conditions or offered such per-
sons coverage only at exorbitant rates.5"' The growing population
of uninsured and practically uninsurable Americans presented
Congress with a compelling humanitarian dilemma."' But Con-
gress also confronted a severe threat to the long-term health of
the economy.'"' The uninsurable were often practically unemploy-
able and, in any event, were at grave risk of bankruptcy and pov-
erty."' This economic dislocation, in addition to imposing an awe-
147. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. at 42.
149. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Keeps Up Health Care Push, Citing
Uninsured, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/11/us/politics/11
obama.html?scp=1&59=Obama%2OKeeps%20Up%Health%2OCare%2OPush,%20citing%20
Uninsured&st=cse.
150. Id. (citing that during the recent recession, as many as six million more Ameri-
cans have lost their health insurance).
151. See Josh Gerstein, Obama Pitches to Insured Americans, POLITICO (July 22, 2009,
8:21 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/25296.html.
152. Id.
153. Jeff Mason & Matt Spetalnick, Obama Says Insurance Companies Holding U.S.
Hostage, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2009/08/14/us-usa-heal
thcare-obama-idUSTRE57D47P20090814.
154. See Lisa Wangsness & Susan Milligan, 'The Time for Bickering Is Over': Obama
Urges Congress to Overhaul Health Care, Spells Out Details, Denounces Misrepresenta-
tions, Evokes Kennedy's Moral Stance, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 2009, at 1.
155. Michael A. Fletcher, Obama Prods Congress to Reform Health, Saying Window
Could Close, WASH. POST, July 19, 2009, at A6.
156. James Oliphant & Kim Geiger, The Nation: Plenty of Healthcare Aches and Pains,
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some toll of human suffering, also produced ripple effects
throughout the broader economy. When joined with the specter of
exponentially increasing health care costs, the purely economic
consequences of the health care status quo ante required congres-
sional action to prevent a crippling economic crisis. Or so Con-
gress reasonably concluded."'
Congress responded by, among other things, sharply circum-
scribing the ability of insurance companies to deny coverage or
charge differential rates on the basis of applicants' pre-existing
conditions.' The power of Congress to impose these restrictions
on the multi-billion dollar, interstate health insurance industry is
beyond reasonable debate and, in fact has not been questioned in
any of the cases challenging the constitutionality of the ACA. 5
But once one acknowledges congressional power to enact these
restrictions, the power to enact the individual mandate follows as
night follows day. The prohibitions on insurer discrimination
against applicants with pre-existing conditions'" would, if enact-
ed alone, create a perverse incentive to defer purchasing health
insurance unless and until seriously ill."' Health insurance would
be only for the sick and the paranoid. Hence, the ACA requires
that most Americans buy health insurance beginning in 2014.6'
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at A17 (citing a Harvard University study, which found that in
2007 an American family filed for medical bankruptcy once every ninety seconds).
157. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
(stating that Congress had a rational basis to conclude that, in the aggregate, decisions to
forego insurance coverage and attempt to pay for health care out of pocket drive up the
cost of insurance); cf. Mark A. Hall, The Factual Bases for Constitutional Challenges to the
Constitutionality of Federal Health Insurance Reform, 38 N. KY. L. REV. (457, 487-88
(2011) (attempting "to collect the full range of available empirical data that sheds light on
a range of legal challenges" to the ACA and concluding that those challenges have little or
no factual basis supporting Congress's decision that an individual mandate was necessary
to its plan of reform).
158. As part of the ACA, Congress passed the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan
(PCIP) which will prohibit insurance companies from discriminating against health care
consumers based on pre-existing conditions. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201(2)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 154 (2010) (prohibiting health insur-
ers from imposing "any pre-existing condition exclusion").
159. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.
Supp. 2d. 1256, 1275 n.11 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (acknowledging Congress's power to regulate
the health insurance industry).
160. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201(2)(A).
161. See Thomas More Law Ctr., 720 F. Supp. 2d at 895 ("Without the minimum cover-
age provision, there would be an incentive for some individuals to wait to purchase health
insurance until they needed care, knowing that insurance would be available at all
times.").
162. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501 (requiring non-exempted
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Even if the mandate cannot, standing alone, be justified as a reg-
ulation of interstate commerce, and for the reasons set forth
above it likely can, it nonetheless is within Congress's independ-
ent power, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, to make its
other regulations of Commerce (here, the prohibitions on denying
coverage because of an applicant's pre-existing conditions) effec-
tive.
These restrictions are precisely the kind of "regulatory scheme
that could be undercut""' absent a health insurance mandate.
Not only was it reasonable for Congress to conclude that an ex
ante mandate to purchase health insurance was essential to a
regulatory scheme that included ex post prohibitions on discrimi-
nation against applicants because of pre-existing conditions, but
indeed this conclusion may have been the only reasonable one.164
In any event, congressional concern that the prohibitions on dis-
crimination against applicants with pre-existing conditions would
endanger the private health insurance industry absent a pur-
chase mandate cannot be dismissed as unreasonable.
Once again, it is not necessary to conclude that this chain of
reasoning sweeps away all contrary considerations. But the anal-
ysis should make clear that existing Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence provides the tools to build a case for the ACA, including the
individual mandate.
1. The Case Against Congressional Power
How then to explain the fact that two federal judges have held
that the individual mandate exceeded congressional authority?
The case against the constitutionality of the Act depends upon a
distinction between activity and inactivity. The ACA's litigation
individuals to maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage in 2014).
163. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (showing that non-economic
activity may be regulated provided it is "an essential part of a larger regulation of econom-
ic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated.").
164. Certainly the fit between the mandate and the coverage provisions is at least as
tight as the connection between non-commercial, intrastate medical marijuana possessed
in accordance with state law and the federal effort to eliminate the interstate market in
the drug for recreational purposes. However, the latter relationship was deemed sufficient
to authorize a federal criminal prohibition on the possession of any amount of marijuana
anywhere in the United States for any purpose, regardless of its source. Gonzales v.
Raichi, 545 U.S. 1, 41-42 (2005).
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opponents have argued that the individual mandate regulates in-
activity because it penalizes the individual for simply doing noth-
ing.'65 As the ACA's defenders have noted in response, given the
undeniable frailty of this mortal coil and existing practices (in-
cluding some legal requirements) that all those in our borders
and in dire need of medical care receive it, it is far from clear that
declining to purchase health insurance can really be character-
ized as doing nothing."' By failing to take the responsible step of
providing a means to pay for the potentially catastrophic cost of
care one may need and receive, in the future, the individual who
foregoes health insurance acts in reliance on society as a form of
insurance.
Regardless, as interesting as these semantic distinctions may
be, it is ultimately unnecessary to resolve them to pass upon the
legal challenge to health care reform. Even if the individual man-
date is best understood as a regulation of inactivity, that does not
automatically mean it is unconstitutional. As others have trench-
antly observed, it is far from clear why even inactivity that, when
considered in context, undermines a regulatory scheme crafted in
response to a genuine threat to the nation's economic well-being
should be immune from congressional regulation.'
The two decisions striking down the requirement labeled such
a regulation of inactivity as "unprecedented." To be sure, if that
label is a fair one,"' this means that no controlling legal authority
requires a lower federal court to sustain the law against constitu-
tional challenge. Of course, it likewise means that no controlling
legal authority dooms the law to invalidation. No precedent re-
165. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 772 (E.D. Va. 2010).
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (2006) (imposing duty on emergency rooms to exam-
ine and stabilize persons who present with emergency medical conditions). See generally,
Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 631 (W.D. Va. 2010) (discussing the
government's arguments that the decision to forgo health insurance and wait until its use
is necessary is, in itself, an economic decision).
167. See The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (Feb 2, 2011) (prepared statement of Professor Charles
Fried, Harvard Law School).
168. According to the government and two of the courts that have already ruled on the
ACA, it is not clear that the individual mandate is unprecedented activity. See Mead v.
Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 33 (D.D.C. 2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court has upheld
Congress's authority to regulate the health care industry, and that it is unique from other
industries); see also id. at 36 (holding that there is no distinction between activity and in-
activity). Even if the individual mandate is accepted as unprecedented, that, by itself, does
not render the legislation unconstitutional. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
607 (2000).
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quires a judge to declare the act unconstitutional.1' The truly dis-
interested judge would, in this worst case scenario for the law, be
left in equipoise, with little or no guidance as to how to resolve
the controversy. As others have trenchantly observed, it is far
from clear why even inactivity that, when considered in context,
undermines a regulatory scheme crafted in response to a genuine
threat to the nation's economic well being should be immune from
congressional regulation.
At its core, the case against the ACA relies chiefly upon the
claim that a decision upholding the mandate will confer on Con-
gress virtually unlimited authority. It is argued that if Congress
can compel an individual to buy health insurance, then Congress
must also have to the power to compel individuals to buy and
even (gasp!) eat broccoli, or other noxiously nutritious fare."'o The
individual mandate is characterized as a first step onto to a "slip-
pery slope" that leads ineluctably to the demise of the Constitu-
tion's central design by which the federal government was con-
fined to enumerated, and therefore limited, powers.
These arguments have rhetorical strength, which is why they
have prevailed in two of the five district courts to rule on the con-
stitutional issue. But upon closer examination they are less than
compelling. As an initial matter, contemporary claims about
threats to the enumerated powers scheme urgently call for closing
the barn door about seventy years after the horse escaped. In the
wake of the New Deal constitutional crisis, the Supreme Court ef-
fectively abdicated any meaningful role in the enforcement of the
limits imposed upon Congress by the Constitution's enumeration
of its powers.'72 To be sure, the Court's decisions in United States
v. Lopez'. and United States v. Morrison,'7 4 kindled hopes of a re-
vival, albeit it a narrow one, of this judicial prerogative.
169. See Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1825, 1831 (2011) (concluding that "[t]here is not a breath of suggestion in
[previous Supreme Court] decisions that Congress may not reach economic inactivity" and
observing that the "Court has never been called upon to decide this issue").
170. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.
Supp. 2d 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (discussing and endorsing these arguments).
171. See, e.g., id.
172. See generally MCAFFEE, supra note 75, at 143-62 (discussing judicial efforts to
enforce the enumerated powers scheme in the 1930s).
173. 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
174. 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
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But to whatever extent these hopes were reasonable, they were
dashed by the Court's 2005 ruling in Raich v. Gonzales.1 7 ' There,
the Rehnquist Court, in one of its final constitutional decisions,
recognized congressional authority to prohibit possession of any
amount of marijuana, anywhere in the United States for any
purpose, regardless of its source."'7 In dissent, Justice Thomas
aptly characterized Raich as supplying yet another epitaph for
judicial enforcement of the enumerated powers scheme:
Diane Monson and Angel Raich use marijuana that has never been
bought or sold, that has never crossed state lines, and that has had
no demonstrable effect on the national market for marijuana. If
Congress can regulate this under the Commerce Clause, then it can
regulate virtually anything-and the Federal Government is no177
longer one of limited and enumerated powers.
The Court's ruling in Raich cannot be dismissed as an isolated
misstep. Rather, Raich was part of a century-old pattern of con-
servative judges marching forward federalism principles when
Congress does something they do not like, and then conveniently
forgetting them when Congress does something they do like."' Of
course, a selectively invoked federalism is, in fact, not federalism
at all. It is instead a tool for jurists to dismantle laws they do not
like for other reasons, leaving intact laws equally obnoxious to
federalism principles that they happen to believe salutary, em-
powering them to pick and choose among federal statutes on a
basis they never need to articulate, let alone defend.
Even if that context were ignored, the claim that a decision up-
holding the individual mandate would in turn become a precedent
for unlimited congressional authority fails on its own terms. The
175. 545 U.S. 1, 23-25 (2005).
176. See id. at 32-33.
177. Id. at 57-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas added that according to the
majority's opinion,
the Federal Government may now regulate quilting bees, clothes drives, and
potluck suppers throughout the 50 States. This makes a mockery of Madi-
son's assurance to the people of New York that the "powers delegated" to the
Federal Government are "few and defined," while those of the States are
"numerous and indefinite."
Id. at 69 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (James Madison)) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Justice Thomas also noted that "[o]ne searches the Court's opinion in vain for any hint of
what aspect of American life is reserved to the States." Id. at 70.
178. See generally Bryant, supra note 57, at 102-06 (providing an overview of Justices
who adhered to federalist principles in the context of narcotics regulation when adherence
was consistent with policy preferences).
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argument ignores the possibility of a ruling narrowly confined to
the peculiar circumstances giving rise to the ACA. A recognition
of congressional power to mandate that citizens enter into quali-
fying private health insurance transactions would not, as the
ACA's constitutional opponents have maintained, necessitate the
conclusion that Congress could likewise mandate innumerable
other private transactions, such as the purchase of gym member-
ships, automobiles, or even the dreaded broccoli."' Health care is
an unusual if not unique good, in that the need for it is often sud-
den, unexpected, and life-threatening.' Moreover, in many such
cases the needed care is catastrophically expensive."' Finally, no
mortal individual can ever be certain that she will not in the fu-
ture develop such a need for overwhelmingly expensive care.18
None of this can be said about gym memberships, automobiles,
or leafy green vegetables."' The distinctive nature of the health
care and health insurance markets matters because it affords a
basis for limiting the reach of any judicial ruling sustaining the
ACA's constitutionality. Whether Congress could mandate the
purchase of automobiles' to stimulate a recovery in the auto in-
dustry could remain undecided until the unlikely day Congress
attempts to do so. Were that case ever to arise, it would present a
genuinely open question, as the fit between that purchase man-
date and whatever perceived problem prompted the law simply
would not be the same as that relied upon to sustain the ACA.
Upholding the ACA would, to be sure, require the Court to
abandon the mythical absolute bar on congressional regulation of
179. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (asserting that the logical extreme of the government's broad
reading of the commerce power could lead to Congress requiring people to eat broccoli be-
cause it is part of commerce and may lead to healthier people).
180. See Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 37 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that the health
care market is unique because of two factors: "the inevitability of individuals' entrance
into that market and the obligation of providers to serve those who do enter" into it).
181. See id. at 38 (noting that approximately 62% of personal bankruptcies in part re-
sult from a lack of coverage).
182. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
(calling health care a "fundamental need" for all people).
183. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 633-64 (W.D. Va. 2010)
(exploring the uniqueness of health care from other services).
184. When asked about Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky, a constitutional scholar, replied that "Congress could use its commerce
power to require people to buy cars." See Wheat, Weed, and Obamacare: How the Com-
merce Clause Made Congress All-Powerful, REASONTV (Aug. 25, 2010), http://reason.tv/
video/show/wheat-weed-and-obamacare-how-t.
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inactivity under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper
Clause. But it would not of its own force bestow upon Congress a
wide-ranging authority to mandate private purchases. Were the
ACA found to be a constitutional statute, notwithstanding its
regulation of inactivity, this conclusion would not make the fact
that future laws also regulated inactivity irrelevant to the consti-
tutional inquiry. The ACA is premised on an extraordinarily
strong case that a purchase mandate is indispensable to a regula-
tory regime Congress otherwise indisputably has the power to
enact.15 A court could be confident that future assertions of the
authority to mandate purchases, should they ever present them-
selves, would not be insulated from meaningful constitutional
scrutiny by the precedent of the ACA.
Close examination reveals that the consequences of upholding
the ACA have been greatly exaggerated."' Moreover, as noted
above, the worst that can be said about the law is that it is with-
out precedent, which ultimately means only that no existing legal
precedent dictates an answer to the constitutional question. In
this light, the arguments against the validity of the Act are nei-
ther implausible nor compelling. At best, the ACA's opponents
can argue the matter to a stalemate. The truly disinterested
judge would, in this worst case scenario for the law, be left in eq-
uipoise, with little or no guidance from the traditional sources of
legal authority as to how to resolve the controversy.""
Of course, it is in precisely such circumstances that the typical-
ly negligible pull of constitutional forbearance becomes signifi-
cant. The strength of that attraction should turn in part on the
extent to which the cases have been politicized.
185. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Con-
stitutionality of Health Care Reform (Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 11-25,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1758986 (developing this argument).
186. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (expressing concerns that under the government's position,
Congress would have the power to compel the purchase and consumption of broccoli or the
purchase of a General Motors automobile).
187. Cf. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 768 F. Supp. 2d 7678, 775 (E.D. Va.
2010) (acknowledging that existing Commerce Clause precedents supplied only a "finite
well of jurisprudential guidance in surveying the boundaries of [this] power").
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B. The Politics of "Obamacare"
Numerous characteristics of the Obamacare cases coalesce to
present an almost "perfect storm" of forbearance opportunity. The
most important is the political salience of the debate over legisla-
tion. The extraordinary partisanship that has infected the ensu-
ing litigation has only exacerbated the political sensitivity of the
constitutional issue. In light of this context, the lawsuits chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the individual mandate present
the courts with the most glaring opportunity for meaningful con-
stitutional forbearance since the missed opportunity provided by
the 2000 presidential election."'8
1. The Bill
As the moniker "Obamacare" suggests, the ACA has become a
singularly signal achievement of the first two years of Obama's
presidency."' It was enacted after more than a year of vigorous
congressional and public debate that stirred passions like little
else in the preceding two decades.' That debate was rancorous
and, at times, unseemly."' More to the point, it was frequently
conducted in apocalyptic terminology. 9 2 It resulted in a compro-
mise that fully satisfied few, but that nevertheless was promptly
hailed as the culmination of three-quarters of a century of Demo-
cratic efforts."'
Health care reform was one of the foremost domestic policy is-
sues addressed in the 2008 presidential election.'94 As a candi-
date, Obama adopted a more moderate position than Hillary Clin-
ton, eschewing her proposal that Congress enact a federal
188. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000); see also Pushaw, supra note 10, at 585-
87 (asserting that with Bush v. Gore and the subsequent scholarly reaction "[t]he politici-
zation of constitutional law had reached its apex").
189. See James Oliphant, A Year Later, Healthcare Law Is Still in Contention: Public
Attitudes Toward It Have Not Shifted Much Despite the Best Efforts of Both Political Par-
ties to Praise It or Bury It, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2011, at 17.
190. See infra notes 199-228 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
192. See Mark Z. Barabak, Anger in the Streets of Washington: Protestors Decry
Obama's Agenda-Especially Healthcare, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at 1.
193. See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
194. See Editorial, The Battle Over Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at WK11.
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mandate to purchase health insurance."' His first few weeks as
President were consumed by the threat that the worst recession
in decades would deepen into a depression,"' but the Democratic
party still chose to make health care a paramount priority of
Obama's first term."' By the end March 2009, the chairs of the
relevant congressional committees-all Democrats-had largely
settled on the broad contours of legislative reform."' Few, if any,
anticipated that the final vote on the legislation was still a year
199
away.
In June and July, committees in both the House and the Sen-
ate approved different bills, albeit along strict party-line votes.200
During the August recess, congressional town-hall meetings be-
came venues for contentious clashes over the proposed legislation,
at which members of Congress were "shouted down, hanged in ef-
figy and taunted" by the bills' opponents, including many affiliat-
ed with the emerging "Tea Party."20' In some instances, the rude-
ness ripened into violence, with noisy demonstrations leading to
"to fistfights, arrests and hospitalizations."2 02 What initially ap-
peared to be an organic, grassroots movement was in fact the
product of exhortations by prominent conservative commentators
such as Sean Hannity, Glenn Beck, and Rush Limbaugh.203
Limbaugh went so far as to suggest a likeness between the
Obama Administration's health care logo and a symbol used by
the Nazis.204 Several town-hall meetings ended in chaos when
crowds opposed to the proposed legislation succeeded in drowning
195. See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Clinton, Obama, Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008,
at A23 (comparing and contrasting the two candidates' health care plans and concluding
that Clinton's plan would cover more Americans and reach closer to universal coverage
than Obama's).
196. See Edmund L. Andrews & David M. Herszenhorn, Plan to Jump-Start Economy
With No Instruction Manual, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2009, at Al.
197. See Robert Pear, Senator Takes Initiative on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2008, at A18.
198. See Robert Pear, Democrats Agree on a Health Plan; Now Comes the Hard Part,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at A19.
199. See id.
200. See Thomas Maier, The Best Rx For What Ails Us?; Two Plans in Congress Stir
Supporters, Opponents; Costs and Depth of Coverage Part of Thorny Issues, NEWSDAY, July
19, 2009, at Al8.
201. See, e.g., Ian Urbina, Beyond Beltway, Health Debate Turns Hostile, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2009, at Al.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
2012] 731
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
out the remarks of the sponsoring member of Congress.205 Even
more concerning a congressional Democrat even received a death
threat.2 06
When members of Congress returned from the recess, they
brought the rancor with them. Speaking to a joint session of Con-
gress, President Obama disclaimed any intent to extend health
insurance coverage to illegal immigrants.20 7 In response, South
Carolina Republican Joe Wilson shouted, "you lie!"208 This ex-
traordinary breach of decorum earned Wilson a formal rebuke by
the House of Representatives and prompted an extended public
discussion about the need for civility in political discourse.20' The
possibility of a bipartisan effort grew increasingly remote.
That fall Democrats finally overrode steadfast Republican op-
position to pass separate bills in both chambers of Congress.
Speaker Pelosi cobbled together a fragile coalition of liberals and
more conservative "Blue Dog" Democrats sufficient to approve the
House bill by a narrow 220-215 vote on November 7.210 Then, in a
dramatic Christmas Eve session, the Senate passed its version of
the bill, defeating a threatened filibuster without the aid of a sin-
gle Republican vote.2 1  But each bill had yet to pass in the non-
sponsoring chamber. Then the August 2009 death of Senator Ed-
ward Kennedy threatened to tip the balance against reform in the
Senate."
In a stunning upset, Scott Brown won the special election to fill
Kennedy's Senate seat after a hard-fought campaign in which his
most salient message was his pledge to vote against health care
reform.212 It appeared that the extended, rancorous, and seeming-
ly unprincipled log-rolling in Congress soured support for the
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Carl Hulse, In Lawmaker's Outburst, a Rare Breach of Protocol, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2009, at A26.
208. Id.
209. See Carl Hulse, House Formally Rebukes Wilson for Shouting 'You Lie,' N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2009, at A14.
210. See Noam N. Levey & Janet Hook, House Passes Healthcare Plan: The 220-215
Vote Marks the First Such Victory in Decades of Efforts, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, at A4.
211. Robert Pear, Senate Approves Health Care Bill in Overhaul on Party-Line Vote,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at Al.
212. John Ibbitson, The End of Consensus, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 27, 2009, at Al.
213. See, e.g., Joan Vennochi, Op-Ed., Brown and the Kennedys, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
31, 2010, at 9.
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proposed legislation. 214 Brown not only captured what had for
decades been a solidly Democratic seat,2" but also occupied the
place of a liberal icon who made the achievement of universal
health care his life-long objective.216 Conservative pundits read in
Brown's election a message from the electorate to President
Obama that, in pressing for a health care overhaul, he had mis-
judged the political tenor of the nation and exceeded his man-
date.217 Brown even garnered (and embraced) the nickname "41,"
a reference to the fact that his election provided the Republicans
just enough votes to maintain filibuster in the Senate.2 1 8 Contem-
poraneous national polls indicated that less than 40% of Ameri-
cans approved the Administration's proposal.219 In the wake of
Brown's victory, health care reform was widely deemed dead.220
Rumors of its demise, however, proved to be greatly exaggerat-
ed. Faced with the prospect of a filibuster in the Senate, Demo-
crats shifted their efforts towards getting the House to approve
the bill the Senate had already passed.22 1 Speaker Pelosi initially
reported that she lacked the votes.22 But after the promise of
changes to accommodate the concerns of the most liberal and the
most conservative Democrats, and a bipartisan, day-long, tele-
vised health care summit at the White House, majority support in
the House at last appeared to be within reach.2 3 Still, Pelosi and
the President had to lobby and cajole conservative House Demo-
crats for their support-which ultimately proved fatal to some po-
214. See generally Janet Hook, Obama Also Has Himself to Blame, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2010, at 6 (noting that "[tihe spectacle of Congress' horse-trading, secrecy and gridlock has
fueled today's virulent anti-Washington mood" and that "[t]he way voters saw it, the
smoke-filled room was back-and they did not like it").
215. See Beverly Ford et al., Massachusetts Miracle For the GOP-Bay Staters Tap Re-
publican to Fill Kennedy Senate Seat, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 20, 2010, at 7.
216. See Vennochi, supra note 213.
217. See Ford, supra note 215.
218. See David M. Herszenhorn, The Loneliest Number: 41, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010,
at A24.
219. See Noam N. Levey, Reviving Healthcare, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at 13.
220. See Vennochi, supra note 213.
221. See Levey, supra note 219; Harold Meyerson, Op-Ed., It's Her House; Pelosi's Role
in Passing Healthcare Reform Puts Her in the Top Rank of Speakers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26,
2010, at A27.
222. See Susan Milligan, Mass. in Mind for State of the Union; President Will Address
Voter Unrest Tonight, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2010, at 1.
223. See Christi Parsons, Obama Wants to Curb Insurers; His Healthcare Plan Would
Give the Federal Government the Power to Stop Rate Hikes, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2010, at
Al.
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litical careers-until the eve of the scheduled floor vote.2' Partic-
ularly difficult to resolve were controversies concerning the legis-
lation's treatment of the ever volatile issue of abortion.25 Just
hours before the vote, the last holdout, Bart Stupak of Michigan,
pledged his support in exchange for the President's promise to
promulgate a clarifying executive order prohibiting federal pay-
ment for abortions.226 The final vote in the House was 219 in favor
and 212 opposed.227 On Tuesday, March 23, 2010, President
Obama signed into law the ACA-the first major legislation in
generations to be enacted without a single Republican vote.228
In short, the ACA reflected the settlement of a year-long, deep-
ly divisive, and profoundly partisan legislative ground war over
the structure of a multi-billion-dollar industry. Not since the Civil
and Voting Rights Acts of the 1960s had federal legislation
emerged from a similar crucible. 2 29 The unparalleled acrimony
and duration of the health care debate make it unusually difficult
for judges, no less than any other citizens, to avoid feeling a vest-
ed allegiance either for or against the law, depending upon the
individuals ideological or economic sympathies. This legislative
history alone should give prudent pause to judges called upon
now to undo that pact. As it turned out, however, the ACA's polit-
ical problems were just beginning.
224. See Doyle McManus, Will the 'Blue Dogs' Hunt for Obama?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2010, at A30.
225. See David M. Herszenhorn & Jackie Calmes, Abortion Was at Heart of Wrangling,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8. 2009, at A24.
226. Id.
227. Noam N. Levey & Janet Hook, Healthcare Overhaul; House Passes Historic
Healthcare Overhaul, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at Al.
228. See Peter Nicholas & Christi Parsons, Healthcare Overhaul: Democrats Celebrate
Their Victory, Mar. 24, 2010, L.A. TIMES, at Al; see also Robert S. McElvaine, Before
Health Care Reform, Republicans Weren't Always the Party of 'No!', CHRISTIAN SCl.
MONITOR (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/commentary/opinion/2010/0407/Before-
health-care-reform-Republications-weren't-always-the-party-of-No! (noting that even the
then-highly controversial 1965 statute creating Medicare had the support of nearly half
the House Republicans).
229. See Gail Russell Chaddock, Was Rep. Tom Perriello Targeted for His Vote on
Healthcare Bill?, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/lay
out/set/print/contentiview/print/290189; Editorial, Rhetoric of Violence Must be Reined In,
N.Z. HERALD (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c id=2&
objectid=10698945 (asserting that "[n]ot since the 1960s, when civil rights and the Viet-
nam War aroused heated debate, has the United States been so divided").
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2. The Statute
From the moment of enactment, repeal became a lodestar for
the Republican party.230 Support for the legislation became a de-
fining issue of the 2010 congressional elections, with Republicans
targeting vulnerable Democrats in swing districts.' The strategy
proved successful.23 2 President Obama famously dubbed the 2010
congressional elections "a shellacking."' Republicans took control
of the House and reduced the Democratic margin of majority in
the Senate.2 " The new Speaker of the House, John Boehner of
Ohio, announced his intention to seek repeal of the law, which he
labeled "a monstrosity."23 5 Good to his word, the first action taken
by the new House, after a public reading of the Constitution, was
a vote to repeal the ACA. 36
Of course the vote was largely symbolic, as the matter was sure
to die via filibuster in the Senate, which it did.237 Boehner has also
threatened to block all funding to carry the law into effect, though
that remains to be seen.3 ' Thus, notwithstanding the March 2010
legislative victory, health care reform remains a leading and ac-
tive issue. Only a few weeks into the 112th Congress it became
clear that the Democrats could not reenact the ACA if they had to
but neither could the Republicans effect a repeal. This legislative
stalemate is certain to become one of a very few defining issues in
the 2012 presidential election.
230. See David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Health Vote is Done, but Partisan De-
bate Rages On, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A19.
231. See James O'Toole, A New Political Landscape Emerges: Winning GOP, Losing
Democrats Seek a New Path, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 4, 2010, at Al.
232. See Oliphant, supra note 189 ('The battle over President Obama's signal domestic
policy goal played a major role in transforming the political landscape.").
233. See Carol E. Lee & Glenn Thrush, Barack Obama Vows to Work with GOP After
'Shellacking', POLITICO (Nov. 3, 2010) http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/44657.
html.
234. See, e.g., Jeff Zeleny, G.O.P. Takes House; Reid is Re-Elected and Keeps Leader's
Job, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at Al.
235. David M. Herszenhorn, Road Ahead Turns Right, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at Bl.
236. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, As Vowed, House Votes to Repeal
Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2011, at Al; Jennifer Steinhauer, Constitution Has
Its Day (More or Less) in House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, at A15.
237. See, e.g., Herszenhorn & Pear, supra note 236, at Al (describing also the Senate
plan to block the repeal).
238. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Republicans Are Given a Price
Tag for Health Law Repeal, but Reject It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, at Al5 (discussing
Speaker Boehner's plans to refuse implementation of the health care law).
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3. The Litigation
Within minutes of the President's signing of the ACA, a coali-
tion of partisan, elected state attorneys general and private par-
ties-led by Bill McCollum, the Republican Attorney General
Florida, who was then a candidate for governor-challenged the
constitutionality of the law in federal court.23 9 The case was
brought in the Northern District of Florida, which was thought
likely, with good reason it turns out, to assign a judge inclined to
offer a sympathetic hearing.24 0 This filing was accompanied by
press releases and conferences obviously aimed at deflecting at
least some of the Democrats glory and clouding the media mes-
sage for the day.241 Over the next few months, numerous addi-
tional suits were brought challenging the constitutionality of the
ACA. 242 Seven states have taken the extraordinary step of enact-
ing state statutes or adopting state constitutional amendments
purporting to preclude enforcement of the ACA.2 43 Both the litiga-
tion and the state statutes were then widely seen as largely sym-
bolic. The statutes were patently invalid under the Supremacy
Clause, and most commentators thought little more of the law-
suits, which were decried as hallow publicity stunts.24 4
239. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1250, 1263 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
240. See Marianne Goodland, Colorado Republicans Praise Latest Florida Court Ruling
on Health Care Reform, COLO. STATESMAN (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.coloradostatesman.
com/content/992560-colorado-republicans-praise-latest-florida-court-ruling-health-care-re
form (noting that "[1]iberal groups and bloggers have accused the plaintiffs of 'forum-
shopping,' or looking for the most conservative court in which to file the case").
241. See Warren Richey, Attorneys General in 14 States Sue to Block Healthcare Reform
Law, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Attorneys-Gen
eral-in- 14-states-sue-to-block-healthcare -reform.
242. See Rosalind S. Helderman, 'Straight Arrow' Considers Health-Care Suit, WASH.
POST, Dec. 8, 2010, at Bl (noting that more than fifteen lawsuits challenging the ACA had
been filed around the country).
243. See, e.g., Virginia Health Care Freedom Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (Cum.
Supp. 2011); see also supra O'Toole, note 231 (stating that the November 2010 election
"results included the passage of ballot questions designed to block the health care bill's
implementation in Arizona and Oklahoma, while a similar measure was defeated in Colo-
rado"). See generally Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-
Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 113-14 (2010) (review-
ing and evaluating the on-going "health reform nullification trend" and noting that
"[sleven states ... enacted resolutions establishing that citizens of their respective states
would not be required to comply with the new federal mandate that all individuals obtain
health insurance"); Katharine Q. Seelye, States Look to Forestall Hypothetical Mandate,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, at A21.
244. See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold & N.C. Aizenman, Health Law Fight Shifting to
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In these suits, the plaintiffs raised a broad array of arguments.
The courts uniformly rejected nearly all these claims as legally
groundless. To the surprise of many, however, two judges ulti-
mately held determined that Congress lacked the power to im-
pose the individual mandate. One, Judge Hudson of the eastern
district of Virginia, severed the mandate from the rest of the
massive law.245 The other, Judge Vinson, who sits in the northern
district of Florida where the first suit was filed, invalidated the
law in its entirety,246 though he later stayed his ruling and al-
lowed implementation efforts to go forward pending appeal of his
decision.2 47 These and other district court rulings now await re-
view in the federal appeals courts.
The opinions of Judges Hudson and Vinson, and indeed of all
the judges to reach the merits, acknowledged the extraordinarily
divisive and partisan nature of the process leading to the law's
enactment."' They also expressly disclaimed that their decisions
in any way reflected their views about the wisdom of the law.4
That all the judges reaching the merits found it necessary to state
this proposition, which in most cases is taken for granted, uncon-
sciously echoed Justice Owen Roberts's notorious characterization
of judicial review as mechanical in his discredited opinion for the
Court in United States v. Butler.2 50 Then, as now, it might be
thought that the judges "doth protest too much."25 1
The inclusion of disclaimers such as these also reflected the
judges' expectations that their opinions would soon be made fod-
Courts, WASH. PosT, Feb. 3, 2011, at Al (noting that initially legal scholars widely viewed
the litigation "as a quixotic political tactic").
245. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 790 (E.D. Va. 2010).
246. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1306 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
247. Id. at 1319.
248. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., F.
Supp. 2d 1120, 1127-28 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
249. See, e.g., id. at 1128.
250. See 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936) ("When an act of Congress is appropriately chal-
lenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of
the government has only one duty,-to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked
beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the
former. All the court does, or can do, is to announce its considered judgment upon the
question."). See generally Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 51 & n.13
(2010) (citing this passage as "[p]erhaps the most prominent example" of "mechanical ju-
risprudence").
251. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 2, c.240 (E.K. Chambers ed., D.C.
Health & Co. 1917).
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der for mass media. In this expectation they could not have been
disappointed. Few district court rulings merit discussion by the
President during his pre-Super-Bowl television interview.252 But
of course, the district court decisions were only initial steps along
the federal judicial path, and all such roads lead to the Supreme
Court. Talking heads, pundits of all stripes, and even a few legal
scholars were not in the least shy about predicting the likely divi-
sion of the Justices on the issue.'
The extent to which Justice Kagan should recuse herself from
cases due to her involvement with them while Solicitor General
has proven unusually contentious and garnered disproportionate
attention; much of it focused on the prospect of the High Court's
ruling on the constitutionality of the ACA-which some have at-
tributed to the possibility that her presence or absence might be
decisive in a High Court test of the law. 254
The timing of the litigation continues to exacerbate its political
impact.25 5 If, as is expected, the various appeals are given priority
252. See Darlene Superville, Obama, Fox Host O'Reilly Talk Politics, Football: Presi-
dent Says People Who Say They Hate Him Don't Know Him, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 7, 2011,
at A8.
253. See David A. Fahrenthold & N.C. Aizenman, supra note 244 (observing that "[tihe
high court's decision, assuming it does get the final word, may turn on its 'swing justice,'
who frequently breaks ties between the four liberals and four conservatives on the bench"
and quoting Harvard law professor Richard Fallon as saying that the litigation in the low-
er courts is "essentially a rehearsal for Anthony Kennedy"); see also A Brisk Constitution-
al, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, at 5P ("Many pundits expect it to be a 5-4 deci-
sion, with Justice Anthony Kennedy the swing vote whichever way the high court rules.");
Joe Carlson, Moving Forward; Law's Future Uncertain; Hospitals Implementing Plans,
MODERN HEALTH CARE, Dec. 20, 2010, at 8 ("With the case now heading to the Supreme
Court by all signs, a central question has become whether the court's Libertarian-minded
swing vote, Justice Anthony Kennedy, would vote with liberals or conservatives."); Edito-
rial, When the Supreme Court Takes up the Obama Health-Care Law 'Mandate',
CHRISTIAN ScI. MoNITOR (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-mon
itors-view/2010/12 14/When-the-Supreme-Court-takes-up-the-Obama-health-care-law-man
date ("Justice Anthony Kennedy, as often happens, could be the swing vote."); Ezra Klein,
The Justice Will See You Now; The Fate of Obama's Health-Care Law May Rest with One
Man, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14, 2011, at 16 ("And once it gets those, odds are the bill's fate will
come down to one person: Justice Kennedy."); Warren Richey, Health Care Reform: Battle-
ground Shifts to Florida Courtroom, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.
csmonitor.com/USA/Justtice/2010/1215/Health-care-reform-Battleground-shifts-to-Florida-
courtroom ("Some analysts predict it could be a close case, with Justice Anthony Kennedy
potentially casting the deciding vote.").
254. See Warren Richey, Would Elena Kagan Bow Out of a Health-Care Reform Case?,
CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR (July 15, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/con
tent/view/printl314283; see also Adam Liptak, To Recuse or Not, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010,
at WK5.
255. See Noam N. Levey & David G. Savage, Key Healthcare Provision Voided; Requir-
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in the courts of appeals, the matter is on course for a Supreme
Court ruling in June of 2012.256 A decision at that date, and espe-
cially one invalidating the law, would undoubtedly figure promi-
nently in the nationwide discussion leading up to the fall presi-
dential election.257 Worse, the Justices' opinions could be crafted
with that end in mind. It might even be unrealistic to think that
the Justices would not take into account their potential value as
partisan soundbites.2 58 Indeed, within hours of its publication,
Judge Hudson's ruling invalidating the ACA's individual man-
date was featured in a Republican solicitation for campaign con-
tributions.2 "
Hence, nearly everything about the manner in which these cas-
es have been litigated, decided, and reported on by the press,
suggests that they threaten to turn the federal judiciary into a po-
litical football. To do so would, of course, further politicize this
nominally non-partisan branch of government and further erode
whatever difference remains between constitutional law and par-
tisan politics. Yet while these cases present the risk of exacerbat-
ing these trends, they also present opportunity for the judiciary to
do much to reverse them by exercising judicial forbearance. How
they might do so is discussed below.
ing People to Buy Insurance is Unconstitutional, a Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2010,
at Al.
256. See id. ("Declaring a core part of the new health care law unconstitutional, a fed-
eral judge in Virginia has launched President Obama's signature domestic achievement
into a gantlet of conservative-leaning courts that will almost certainly conclude at the Su-
preme Court just as the 2012 election is cresting.").
257. Id.
258. Senior D.C. Circuit Judge Laurence Silberman even coined a term for the Justices'
awareness of how their opinions might be received by the mass media; he labeled this
awareness, and by implication the impact it would in turn have on the Justices' opinions,
the other Greenhouse effect-alluding to Pullitzer-prize-winning journalist Linda Green-
house, who long covered the Supreme Court for the New York Times. See Amnon Reich-
man, The Dimensions of Law: Judicial Craft, Its Public Perception, and the Role of the
Scholar, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1619, 1638 n.85 (2007); see also Miguel Schor, Judicial Review
and American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 535, 542 (2008)
("Conservatives complain that justices 'drift' left because they 'listen' to the opinions of
cultural and media elites such as Linda Greenhouse, a reporter who writes extensively on
the Supreme Court for the New York Times, in what some have called the 'Greenhouse
effect.") (footnotes and citations omitted).
259. See, e.g., Levey & Savage, supra note 255.
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C. What Forbearance Would Look Like
Each additional judicial opinion by a Republican-appointed
judge against the constitutionality of the individual mandate bol-
sters the claim that the results in important constitutional cases
turn more on political preferences than on law. So the best thing
the federal judiciary can do is to stop issuing such opinions. Harm
has already been done by the two district court decisions invali-
dating the law. But if they are reversed on appeal, and the appel-
late courts are unanimous in upholding the law, that harm will
be contained. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court could
simultaneously avoid committing itself on the issue and stay out
of the fray by simply declining to exercise jurisdiction, 260 an act
requiring no explanation and of no precedential significance. 261
But if the past is prologue, at least one circuit court will even-
tually rule against the constitutionality of the law, which will in
effect force the Supreme Court to decide the matter.62 Once there,
unanimity would again be ideal. It is also extremely unlikely.
Justice Thomas has since Lopez consistently called for the aban-
donment of modern precedents and a return to an understanding
more in keeping with that of the 1780s. 26 3 For present purposes,
the key word is "consistently." This means that his vote will do
little or no harm to the notion that constitutional law or interpre-
tation is more than just politics. By repeatedly adhering to his
narrow understanding of federal legislative power in the face of
what must have mighty temptations to yield to his contrary policy
preferences,26 4 Justice Thomas has earned the right to vote to
strike down "Obamacare." No fair assessment of his record on
congressional power would dismiss such a vote as mere politics.
The same cannot be said for any of his conservative brethren. All
260. See generally SUP. CT. R. 10 (declaring that "[r]eview on a writ of certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of judicial discretion" and identifying considerations weighed in ruling
on a petition for the writ).
261. See Jonathan L. Entin, Insubstantial Questions and Federal Jurisdiction: A Foot-
note to the Term-Limits Debate, 2 NEV. L.J. 608, 612 (2002) ("A denial of certiorari, the
Court has often explained, has no precedential weight.").
262. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605 (2000) ("Because the Court
of Appeals invalidated a federal statute on constitutional grounds, we granted certiorari.").
263. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549, 589 (1995) (Thomas J., concur-
ring).
264. See, e.g., Raich v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1, 57 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United
States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1970 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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four of them have in recent years strayed from their federalism
vows,265 and their purported discovery of an inflexible commit-
ment to them when ruling on "Obamacare" would fool none but
the foolhardy. Accordingly, to be truly efficacious as an act of con-
stitutional forbearance, the Roberts Court would not only have to
uphold the ACA but do so by an 8-1 margin. The significance of
the Court's forbearance would be dissipated to the extent that
less steadfast friends of strict limits on federal power chose this
case to join Justice Thomas. And, while marginally better than a
ruling invalidating the law, a 5-4 decision upholding the law
would merely confirm the many predictions that the Justices
would divide along partisan lines with the most moderate con-
servative, Justice Kennedy, casting the deciding vote. 2 66
D. Forbearance is not Abdication
One person's constitutional forbearance might be another's po-
litical cowardice. In this light, it is worth asking whether there
exists a category of cases in which the kinds of societal and insti-
tutional considerations that forbearance serves should play no
role whatsoever in a judge's thinking?
The most compelling candidate would be the category of cases
in which the judiciary alone could realistically be expected to act
impartially. One of the most significant theories of modern consti-
tutional law articulated in the last half of the twentieth century
was set forth in John Hart Ely's seminal Democracy and Dis-
trust.2 67 In that book he argued, among other things, that much of
modern constitutional law could best be understood as reflecting
the Court's intuitions about when ordinary political processes
were trustworthy and when systemic problems suggested that
they were not.266 In the latter cases, Ely argued that the Court in-
tervened either to clear away a barrier to the healthy functioning
of the political process,6  or to correct errors the political process
265. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Comstock,
130 S. Ct. at 1953 (majority opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and
Alito).
266. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
267. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
268. Id. at 73-179.
269. The archetypical example is legislative redistricting, where absent judicial inter-
vention legislators would have been only too happy to perpetuate the representational dis-
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itself could never adequately address.2 70 This is no place to take
up a general evaluation of Ely's theory. In any event, it suffices
for present purposes to observe that it remains a dominant trope
in the legal literature.' One does not have to be a partisan or
devotee of the theory to acknowledge that it reflects some degree
of both descriptive and normative truth.
In any event, whatever weight ought to be accorded considera-
tions of process failure, there are no reasons to think that they af-
ford a basis to invalidate the ACA. As recounted above, the law is
the product of one of the most salient, extended, and passionate
political debates in modern memory.2 72 And while this conversa-
tion was at times uncivil, 273 no one can credibly claim that the
March 23, 2010 enactment caught him unawares. And the politi-
cal conversation continues and will undoubtedly be a major issue
in the 2012 election, as it was last fall.
Far more importantly, however, is the fact that the individual
mandate, the only provision in the law found by any judge to be of
doubtful constitutional validity, is exactly the kind of legal impo-
sition which the political process is most likely to impose justly.
As Justice Jackson observed more than sixty years ago,
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget to-
day, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbi-
trary and unreasonable government than to require that the princi-
ples of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be
imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary
action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only
a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the po-
litical retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers
were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws
274
will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation.
parities that put them in office in the first place. See generally STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE &
JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2008).
270. The archetypical example is racial segregation, which was entrenched by a history
of one-party rule in the South that in turn secured it controlling seniority in the Senate.
See Kathleen A. Bergin, Authenticating American Democracy, 26 PACE L. REV. 397, 437
n.212 (2006) (explaining that Southern segregationists held crucial Senate committee
chairs and used these positions to block civil rights legislation for decades).
271. See, e.g., Symposium, On Democratic Ground: New Perspectives on John Hart Ely,
114 YALE L.J. 1193 (2005).
272. See supra notes 194-228 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
274. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., con-
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The constitutional challenges to the individual mandate have
emphasized the unprecedented breadth of this requirement. 7' To
be sure, aside from a few narrow exceptions,27 6 the mandate does
indeed apply to virtually every American.2 77 And it is precisely the
mandate's all-encompassing nature that makes the case for judi-
cial intervention so weak. The universality of the requirement is
itself the most "effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government. 2 78 If the mandate, which has of course
not yet gone into effect, proves in practice to be an intolerable
yoke upon the citizenry, Congress and the President will be una-
ble "to escape the [resulting] political retribution,"' and their
successors will repeal the law. Far from necessitating judicial in-
tervention,280 the circumstances of the ACA's individual mandate
provision bolster the case for leaving the issue to the ordinary po-
litical process.
CONCLUSION
For better or worse, the federal judiciary has already been
drawn deeply and irreversibly into the health care-reform-debate
maelstrom. Additional federal judicial rulings on the merits of the
constitutional arguments arrayed against the statute are inevita-
ble, and a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court finally resolving
the matter seems likely as well.
The ACA cases give those conservative federal judges and Jus-
tices who will decide them an almost perfect opportunity to do
something that is sorely needed and long overdue, and that is to
begin restoration of a distinction between constitutional law and
partisan politics. Few would doubt that these judges must be
sorely tempted to seize the tools afforded by the notoriously inde-
curring).
275. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.
Supp. 2d 1284 (N.D. Fla. 2011). ("Never before has Congress required that everyone buy a
product from a private company (essentially for life) just for being alive and residing in the
United States.").
276. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501, 124 Stat. at 246-48 (ex-
empting categories of persons from mandatory coverage requirement).
277. Id. at 246.
278. Railway Express, 336 U.S. at 112 (Jackson, J., concurring).
279. Id.
280. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the call
for judicial intervention was far more compelling).
2012]1 743
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
terminate law of the post-Lopez Commerce Clause jurisprudence
and employ them to dismantle a federal program detested by the
American right like little else. What is more, the cases are on a
timeline such that they also offer the chance to rob the incumbent
Democratic President of the signal achievement of his first term
in the midst of his reelection campaign. Millions already believe
that these kinds of considerations will prove decisive in the minds
of judges, whether or not they operate consciously. Further judi-
cial rulings along partisan lines of division will deepen such sus-
picions in countless future cases.
For the same reasons, were these judges to decline this oppor-
tunity, to refrain from exploiting it and forego the partisan boun-
ty it promises, they would demonstrate by their actions what a
less partisan constitutional law would look like. To be sure, were
this to occur it would be but small step toward a transformation
of our legal and political culture. But it may be a generation be-
fore another opportunity as significant as this one presents itself.
Moreover, the cases are well timed in another way, and that is
that the Roberts Court has yet to address the precedential signifi-
cance of Lopez and Morrison. There will never be a better time for
the Court to signal that it will not countenance gamesmanship
with constitutional principle. There may never be a better oppor-
tunity for the Roberts Court, should it reach the matter, to exer-
cise constitutional forbearance.
To be clear, only the naive can at this point in our history ex-
pect that it will do so. The Court has recently had countless op-
portunities to exercise forbearance and it has repeatedly declined.
There is little reason to believe that the Justices will suddenly
and dramatically reorient their values in this instance. But as-
suming this essay has convinced you that there is at present an
acute need for constitutional forbearance and that the ACA cases
provide an outstanding opportunity for the same, the question be-
comes, why not? Now might be a good time to start thinking
about whom to blame.
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